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I.  INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES
Individuals and families face difficult choices about health care as the costs of 
medical care and health insurance continues to rise, and as the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act’s “Individual Mandate” approaches.  Well over 160,000 
Americans have found a solution for the high costs of medical care and health 
insurance through the services of Health Care Sharing Ministries (HCSMs).1  
Members of HCSMs also have the benefit of a religious exemption from the 
“Individual Mandate” in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).2  
In brief, these ministries provide “a health care cost sharing arrangement among 
persons of similar and sincerely held beliefs.”3  HCSMs are not-for-profit religious 
organizations that act as clearinghouses for “those who have medical expenses and 
                                                          
1 What is a Health Care Sharing Ministry?, THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING 
MINISTRIES, available at http://www.healthcaresharing.org/hcsm (last visited May 27, 2013); 
see also Twila Brase, MEDICAL SHARING, An Inexpensive Alternative to Health Insurance, 
CITIZENS’ COUNCIL ON HEALTH CARE, 1 (January 2010),  http://www.cchfreedom.org/pr/MED 
ICAL_SHARING-FINAL_JAN2010.pdf.  The number of people participating in HCSMs is 
higher than reported on the Alliance website. See infra text accompanying note 7. 
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2012). 
3 See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1 (the Alliance 
represents two HCSMs, the Christian Care Ministry Medi-Share program and Samaritan 
Ministries International). 
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those who desire to share the burden of those medical expenses.”4  The Alliance of 
Health Care Sharing Ministries, which represents two of the three major HCSMs, 
provides this further information:5  
• HCSMs receive no funding or grants from government sources.   
• HCSMs are not insurance companies. HCSMs do not assume 
any risk or guarantee the payment of any medical bill.  Twenty-
one states as of August 2012 have explicitly recognized this and 
specifically shelter HCSMs from their insurance codes.6
• HCSMs serve more than 160,000 people, with participating 
households in all fifty states.7  
• HCSMs’ participants share more than $120 million per year for 
one another’s health care costs.  
• HCSMs strive to be accessible to participants regardless of their 
income.  
• Traditionally, HCSM costs are a fraction of the cost of insurance 
rates.8
Health Care Sharing Ministries have operated in the United States for about 
thirty years.9  HCSMs are “founded on the biblical mandate of believers to share 
each other’s needs.”10 HCSM members “seek to apply Galatians 6:2, ‘Bear one 
another’s burdens, and thus fulfill the law of Christ’ to . . . ever-rising medical costs 
which can be quite burdensome for anyone . . . ”11  HCSMs enshrine “a principle that 
has been around since the birth and growth of the early Church. The Book of Acts 
reports, ‘All the believers were together and had everything in common. Selling their 
possessions and goods, they gave to anyone as he had need.’”12 Christian members 
of HCSMs “are making a decision to be there for their neighbor in need and bring 
glory to God in the process of sharing.”13   
This Article begins with a survey of the general regulatory landscape for 
HCSMs.  Following that, four key questions about HCSMs structure the rest of this 
Article.  The first question asks, what are HCSMs?  To answer that question, this 
                                                          
4 See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1. 
5 See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1. 
6 E-mail from John Creath, Pub. Pol’y Specialist, Samaritan Ministries, to Benjamin 
Boyd (July 20, 2012, 13:48 MT) (on file with author) (as of August 2012, 21 states have 
exemptions for HCSMs).
7 E-mail from Brian Heller, Gen. Counsel, Samaritan Ministries, to Benjamin Boyd (July 
26, 2012, 08:43 MT) (on file with the author) (Heller states there are now over 160,000 
HCSM members.).  
8 See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1. 
9 See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1. 
10 See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1.   
11 See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1.   
12 See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1. 
13 See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1.   
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Article examines the basic aspects of the Medi-Share program and the Christian 
Brotherhood Newsletter.  Second, this Article asks, what law applies to HCSMs?  In 
reply, this Article briefly surveys the key elements of insurance law and the law 
governing HCSMs.  Third, this Article asks, how have courts treated HCSMs?  To 
answer, this Article surveys two key state court decisions involving HCSMs.  
Fourth, this Article asks, how should courts treat HCSMs?  To answer the last 
question, the Article examines U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the legal and logical 
problems courts and insurance regulators face by forcing HCSMs into insurance law, 
and lastly examines some important considerations lingering on the sidelines – the 
freedom of contract, the freedom of religion, the separation of powers, the 
implications of HCSMs’ status as charitable religious organizations, and federal 
preemption of the regulation of HCSMs under PPACA.  This Article concludes first 
by examining the epilogue to the Reinhold14 decision in Kentucky and second by 
providing some general observations and analysis about HCSMs.   
II.  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
HCSMs certainly sound commendable, but how have state and federal 
government officials viewed HCSMs? HCSMs do have some friends in the corridors 
of state power.15 James Atterholt, Indiana Insurance Commissioner, opined that 
HCSMs are “a group of charitable organizations . . .  are providing a much needed 
answer to one of the greatest problems affecting all Americans today: the payment of 
medical expenses.”16 Atterholt continued: “[t]he members of these organizations 
have voluntarily joined their respective communities to put their faith into practice 
by supporting one another in some of their most serious times of need, much like 
religious communities such as the Amish have done for centuries.”17  Further:  
[t]hese charitable organizations have already been there providing the 
solution, one individual at a time.  HCSM members are putting their 
beliefs into actual, day-to-day practice, that it is their responsibility to 
bear burdens of the members of the community which they voluntarily 
joined because of their common faith and values.18
Atterholt concluded, “I would encourage all regulators to respect citizens’ rights 
to freely pursue their own solutions for their medical expenses, and recognize 
HCSMs for what they are: charitable organizations serving individuals who 
voluntarily support one another in their time of need.”19   
Likewise, Ralph Hudgens, Georgia’s Commissioner of Insurance, found HCSMs 
“a remarkable free-market approach to paying for medical bills.”20 Hudgens reported 
                                                          
14 Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272 (Ky. 2010). 
15 Letter from James Atterholt, Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Ins. to James Lansberry, President, 
Alliance of Health Care Sharing Ministries (May 7, 2009) (on file with author).   
16 Id.  
17 Id.   
18 Id.  
19 Id.   
20 Letter from Ralph T. Hudgens, Comm’r of Ins., State of Ga., to James Lansberry, 
President, Alliance of Health Care Sharing Ministries (Mar. 4, 2011) (on file with author).   
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Georgia has “not had any problems with Health Care Sharing.”21 Mr. Hudgens 
concluded, “Health Care Sharing Ministries are not insurance companies but 
charitable organizations helping participants pay their medical bills.  I applaud your 
efforts to find free market solutions to improve access to health care.”22  Further, Mr. 
John Doak, Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner, wrote that “[m]any members of 
these organizations say they also receive spiritual support from their health-care 
sharing ministry, beyond the financial impact of the group.”23  After noting that 
PPACA exempts “members of a health-care sharing ministry from being required to 
purchase private insurance,” Doak continued: “[a]s a man of great faith, an opponent 
of PPACA, and an advocate of free-market solutions to insurance issues, I support 
health-care sharing ministries as an option for Oklahoma consumers.”24
Apparently, HCSMs also have some allies in the halls of Congress.  As noted 
above, PPACA contains a religious exemption for HCSM members from the 
mandate to purchase insurance.25 Why would these relatively small ministries 
receive a religious exemption from the individual mandate?  HCSM representatives 
persuaded Senate staff members with “more than just an argument based on freedom 
of religion . . . .”26  “[T]hey pointed to the Obama administration's promise that those 
who were happy with their current health coverage could keep it.”27 HCSM 
subscribers received a religious exemption from PPACA’s individual mandate 
precisely because HCSM members are paying their bills and sharing other members’ 
medical expenses.28  In the words of the Act, the “medical expenses of its members 
have been shared . . . .”29  The HCSM religious exemption from PPACA’s individual 
mandate, coupled with HCSMs’ remarkably low rates when compared to the costs of 
health insurance, have contributed to an increased interest in HCSMs.30   
                                                          
21 Id. (“As far as I know, we have had no consumer complaints.”). 
22 Id.   
23 John D. Doak, Understanding Faith-Based Options for Health Care, OK.GOV (Aug. 22, 
2012), http://www.ok.gov/triton/modules/newsroom/newsroom_article.php?id=157&article_ 
id=3765. 
24 Id.   
25 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2012); see 
also, Christians Are Exempt From Insurance Mandates, CHRISTIAN CARE MINISTRY (Aug. 1, 
2012), http://mychristiancare.org/exemption.aspx. 
26 Steve Twedt, Health Care Overhaul Law Exempts Sharing Ministries, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE (July 3, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/health/health-care-
overhaul-law-exempts-sharing-ministries-269561/?p=0. 
27 Id.   
28 Id.
29 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)(2)(B)(ii)(IV) 
(West 2012). 
30 Interest in Samaritan Ministries Increases Following SCOTUS Decision on Health Care 
Law, PRWEB.COM (July 5, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/samaritanministries/07/pr 
web9668682.htm; see also Christine A. Scheller, ‘Obamacare’ Prevails: Supreme Court 
Upholds Healthcare Law, URBAN FAITH (June 28, 2012), http://www.urbanfaith.com/2012/06/ 
obamacare-prevails-supreme-court-upholds-healthcare-law.html/. 
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However, HCSMs do have some foes in the corridors of state power.  HCSMs 
have not gone without challenge, despite their evident charitable and religious 
emphasis. The Kansas Insurance Commissioner, while recognizing the truly 
“religious programs,” nevertheless believed PPACA’s religious exemption for 
HCSMs will lead to “scammers . . . creating fake ministries and soliciting 
members.”31  One observer called an HCSM a Ponzi scheme.32  An appellate judge 
voiced concerns that an HCSM subjected subscribers to “potential scams and other 
unscrupulous tactics.”33 Judge Nickell of Kentucky’s Court of Appeals thought 
Medi-Share was “at best, a supplemental plan for payment of the health care needs 
of its trusting subscribers, and, at worst, a poor substitute for regulated health 
insurance.”34 A few state insurance departments have gone farther, and brought legal 
challenges to these ministries, maintaining HCSMs operate as illegal insurance 
companies.35   
Most recently, the State of Washington’s Insurance Commissioner, Mike 
Kriedler, issued Samaritan Ministries its first36 cease-and-desist order on April 1, 
2011, “telling Samaritan to stop engaging in the unauthorized business of insurance 
                                                          
31 Michelle Andrews, Some Church Groups Form Sharing Ministries To Cover Members' 
Medical Costs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/ 
features/insuring-your-health/michelle-andrews-on-health-care-religious-cooperatives.aspx. 
32 Michael deCourcey Hinds, Christian Group Criticized As Unsound Insurance Plan, N.
Y. TIMES (June 14, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/14/us/christian-group-criticized-
as-unsound-insurance-plan.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (“Mr. Needham said the 
brotherhood program was like a Ponzi scheme, requiring a constant flow of new investors to 
pay off those who joined the scheme earlier.”) Needham was a spokesman for Delaware’s 
Department of Insurance. Id.   
33 Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 2008 WL 4530900 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2008) 
(Thompson, J., dissenting) (Judge Thompson also noted: “consumers in states such as Ohio 
have incurred the financial consequences of the lack of regulation of such businesses.”  Judge 
Thompson was referring to a prior incident in 2001 where Ohio’s Attorney General filed suit 
against the Christian Brotherhood Newsletter, the oldest HCSM, charging the founder of the 
ministry, Bruce Hawthorn, with fraud and conversion of ministry funds and property.  Ohio’s 
“lawsuit demands return of property and cash valued at more than $2.4 million  . . . ”); see 
generally Chuck Fager, Lawsuit: Health Plan Accused, CHRISTIANITY TODAY ONLINE (Apr. 2, 
2001), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2001/april2/8.23.html  (“The Christian 
Brotherhood Newsletter had to repay nearly $15 million that previous management spent on 
homes, motorcycles and luxury cars. The company was placed in receivership in 2001, and the 
management was removed.”); see Sarah Skidmore, Sharing the Burden: Regulation-Free 
Religious Groups Offer Cost-Sharing Alternatives to Traditional Health Insurance by 
Banning Risky, High-Cost Behavior, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Jan. 8, 2006), http://www. 
utsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060108/news_lz1b8burden.html (after this lawsuit, the 
Newsletter continued to operate under new management with established safeguards to 
prevent future problems). 
34 See Reinhold, 2008 WL 4530900 (Nickell, J., concurring in result only). 
35 See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Agency Action And Opportunity for Hearing, 
(Administrative Fine, Permanent Cease and Desist Order and Restitution, In re Am. 
Evangelical Ass’n, Case No. 2006-1 (Mont. Auditor May 22, 2007), available at
http://www.sao.mt.gov/legal/insurance/pdf/I07_Medishare Notice.pdf. 
36 See Andrews, supra note 31, (“[t]his month's action was the first against Samaritan 
Ministries . . . .”).   
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in Washington State [sic].”37 Commissioner Kriedler stated: "[t]hey've made a 
commitment to what is effectively health insurance, that when you need to have your 
medical bills paid they'll help or will pay those costs for you . . . ."38  Kriedler also 
stated, "[o]ur insurance laws exist to protect consumers and make sure that insurers 
live up to their promises . . .  [m]embers of groups like this don't have those 
protections."39  In an effort to steer clear of insurance regulations, HCSMs have 
worked for statutory “safe harbors” from state insurance codes in twenty-one 
states.40  Indeed, Washington’s Insurance Commissioner lifted Samaritan Ministries’ 
cease-and-desist order when the Washington Legislature and Governor Gregoire 
acted quickly to pass Wash. S.S.B. 5122 within 40 days of the cease and desist 
order.41  Wash. S.S.B. 5122 excluded HCSMs from regulation under Washington’s 
Insurance Code.42   
At times, state insurance and commerce departments have brought legal actions 
against HCSMs, alleging the specific ministries engaged in the unauthorized sale of 
insurance, or the sale of insurance without a license.43  The freedom to share health 
care costs through HCSMs has depended largely on whether the courts and state 
insurance regulators view HCSMs as insurance, which is one of the key legal 
questions this Article examines. In the last fifteen years, just two state supreme 
courts have issued reported decisions on whether a health care sharing ministry 
provides a contract for insurance.44   
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Kentucky considered whether the Christian Care 
Ministry and its Medi-Share program provided a “contract for insurance” in the case 
of Commonwealth v. Reinhold.45  Kentucky’s Supreme Court held Medi-Share did 
provide a “contract for insurance” and did not fall within Kentucky’s Religious 
                                                          
37 Samaritan Ministries Ordered to Stop Offering Unauthorized Insurance in Washington 
State, WASH. OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.insurance.wa.gov/about-
oic/news-media/news-releases/2011/4-01-2011.html.  
38 Andrews, supra note 31.  
39 Vanessa Ho, State Shuts Down Health-Care Sharing Ministry, SEATTLE POST 
INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/State-shuts-down-
health-care-sharing-ministry-1319041.php. 
40 See infra Appendix B.   
41 S.S.B. 5122, 2011 Leg., 62nd Sess. (Wash. 2011); Wash. Office of the Ins. Comm’r, 
Order to Cease and Desist Rescinded, (2011), http://www.insurance.wa.gov/oicfiles/orders 
/2011orders/11-0075.pdf. 
42 See Wash. Rev. Code § 48.43.009 (West 2012); S.S.B. 5122, supra note 41. 
43 See Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272 (Ky. 2010), reh’g denied; Barberton 
Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Insurance Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586 N.W.2d 352 
(Iowa 1998), reh’g denied.   
44 Christian Bhd. Newsletter v. Williams, 634 A.2d 938 (Del. 1993), aff’g Christian Bhd. 
Newsletter v. Levinson, C.A. No. 92A-06-016 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1993) (considering and 
finding Christian Bhd. Newsletter (CBN) to be insurance). This Article will not examine in 
detail the New Castle County Superior Court order behind the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
unpublished order in Christian Bhd. Newsletter, focusing instead on the reported Reinhold and 
Barberton cases.  
45 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 273.   
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Publication Exemption for HCSMs.46 The Kentucky Supreme Court’s 5-2 ruling 
overturned a divided Kentucky Court of Appeals’ ruling.47 Justices Scott and 
Cunningham dissented from the Reinhold majority.48  The dissent argued Medi-
Share was not insurance49 and should receive shelter under Kentucky’s Religious 
Publication Exemption.50  
In 1998, Iowa’s Supreme Court also considered whether another HCSM was 
simply providing a “contract for insurance,” the Christian Brotherhood Newsletter 
(CBN), in Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Insurance Division of the Iowa 
Department of Commerce.51 Iowa’s Supreme Court considered “(1) whether a 
Christian newsletter, through which medical costs are spread among its subscribers, 
constitutes an insurance contract; and (2) whether a recently enacted statute . . . 
exempts the newsletter from regulation . . . ”52 The Supreme Court of Iowa 
concluded the CBN plan was not insurance because the health care sharing ministry 
lacked the key element of insurance, the assumption of risk.53  As the Barberton
court affirmed the lower court’s ruling on this ground, it declined to consider 
whether Iowa’s Insurance Code exempted such plans from regulation.54   
III.  WHAT ARE HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES? 
A.  Christian Care Ministries - Medi-Share  
Medi-Share is a “‘sharing ministry’ providing Affordable, Biblical Healthcare.”55  
“[P]eople voluntarily join the program … to help pay the medical bills of other 
members.”56 Medi-Share is not licensed to sell insurance and thus avoids the 
regulatory requirements and oversight to which insurance companies are subject.57  
Prospective Medi-Share members fill out an application form, and Medi-Share 
reviews this information to determine applicant eligibility.58  “[T]he application form 
serves as a ‘commitment’ contract whereby the applicant promises to abide by 
certain Medi[-]Share rules and regulations while participating in the program.”59 The 
“commitment contract” places these responsibilities on Medi-Share members: 
                                                          
46 Id.   
47 Id. at 279, referring to Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 2008 WL 4530900 (Ky. Ct. App. 
Oct. 10, 2008).   
48 Id.   
49 Id. at 280-81.   
50 Id. at 281-82.   
51 Barberton Rescue Missions, 586 N.W.2d at 352. 
52 Id. at 353, citing Iowa Code § 505.22 (1997). 
53 Id. at 356-57.   
54 Id. at 357.   
55 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 273.  
56 Id.  
57 Id.   
58 Id. 
59 Id.
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I understand that I will be responsible each month to access the member 
website, which identifies a fellow Christian who will be receiving my gift 
toward their medical need. I will endeavor to pray for this person and to 
give him or her encouragement by mail. I understand that my fellow 
believers in Christ are relying upon the receipt of my monthly share by 
the first of each month.60
Medi-Share’s commitment contract includes the following disclaimer:  
I understand that Christian Care Ministry (CCM) matches a Medi[-]Share 
member's medical need with other Members who have volunteered, in 
faith, to share in meeting needs through the biblical concept of Christian 
mutual sharing. I further understand that all money comes from the 
voluntary giving of Members, not from the Christian Care Ministry, and 
that the Christian Care Ministry is not liable for the payment of any 
medical bills . . . 61
Medi-Share’s application form “expressly states that a Medi-Share contract is not 
an insurance policy.”62  Medi-Share’s contractual disclaimer provides further: 
ATTENTION—This publication is not issued by an insurance company, 
nor is it offered through an insurance company. This publication does not 
guarantee or promise that your medical bills will be published or assigned 
to others for payment. Whether anyone chooses to pay your medical bills 
is strictly voluntary. This publication should never be considered a 
substitute for an insurance policy. Whether or not you receive any 
payments for medical expenses and whether or not this publication 
continues to operate, you are responsible for payment of your own 
medical bills.63
Medi-Share’s cost-sharing ministry, as it existed at the time of the trial record in 
the Reinhold case, operated as follows:   
Medi-Share members send monthly “share” payments directly to Medi-
Share. The organization retains a percentage of each “share” to cover its 
administrative costs. Medi-Share places the rest of the “share” into a trust, 
with sub-accounts designated for each member. These sub-accounts 
function like escrow accounts.64 When a Medi-Share member has a 
                                                          
60 Id. at 274 (the “rules and regulations include that the applicant be committed to being a 
Christian, live by ‘biblical standards,’ attend church regularly, not use tobacco or illegal drugs, 
and refrain from abusing legal substances such as alcohol”).   
61 Id.
62 Id.   
63 Id.   
64 Stephen Sullivan, General Counsel for Christian Care Ministries, Inc (Medi-Share), 
reports:   
Medi-Share's sharing process has substantially changed since the record in the 
Reinhold case was created. The use of the trust and member sub-accounts has been 
eliminated. Today, members deposit their sharing funds directly into their own 
personal checking account for sharing with other members. If funds are needed to pay 
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medical expense, the member pays the medical provider the applicable 
co-pay.  Then, the member sends a sharing request form directly to Medi-
Share, who reviews the request to see if the medical bill is eligible for 
sharing under Medi-Share’s guidelines. If so, Medi-Share then transfers 
sharing funds directly from the sub-accounts of members that shared to 
the sub-account of the member with the eligible medical bill. Medi-Share 
then issues a check from that member's sub-account directly to the 
member’s medical provider/s. Medi-Share determines which member sub-
accounts are used to fund the payment of eligible members’ sharing 
requests; individual members have no control over which sharing requests 
are paid from their sub-accounts. Thus, Medi-Share members do not 
designate specific member recipients to receive their donation from their 
sub-account. Medi-Share has member guidelines that define what types of 
medical bills are eligible for sharing among the members, provides for 
deductibles, and explains the yearly and lifetime caps on member sharing.  
Medi-Share’s guidelines encourage members to use medical services 
within a group of Preferred Providers, and do so by providing penalties 
for using out-of-network providers.65
B.  The Christian Brotherhood Newsletter - Christian 
Healthcare Ministry
Christian Healthcare Ministries (CHM) is a non-profit ministry, founded in 1981.  
CHM was the first nation-wide66 Health Care Sharing Ministry.67  Originally, CHM 
went by the name “The Christian Brotherhood Newsletter” (CBN) and the 
Newsletter’s members were termed “subscribers.”68  The ministry adopted the name 
Christian Healthcare Ministries in 2006 and its participants are now called 
“members.”69 CHM’s foundational Bible verse is Galatians 6:2: “[b]ear one 
another’s burdens and so fulfill the law of Christ.”70  CHM also “points to the New 
                                                          
a medical bill, the funds are transferred directly between members' individual 
checking accounts, with the check to the provider being issued from the checking 
account of the member with the bill. Members never send their sharing funds to Medi-
Share, and Medi-Share never receives their sharing funds.  
E-mail from Stephen Sullivan, Gen. Counsel, Christian Care Ministries, Inc. (Medi-Share), to 
Benjamin Boyd  (Sept. 10, 2012 12:32 MT) (on file with author).   
65 Id.
66 Nation-wide HCSMs are distinguished from local or church-based health care sharing.  
There are a number of Mennonite church groups who have shared health care expenses on a 
local basis for over fifty years. E-mail from Brian Heller, Gen. Counsel, Samaritan Ministries 
Int’l, to Benjamin Boyd (Sept. 4, 2012, 09:36 MT) (on file with author).   
67 E-mail from Rev. Howard Russell, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Christian 
Healthcare Ministries, to Benjamin Boyd (Aug. 10, 2012 09:58 MT) (on file with author).   
68 Id.  
69 Id.   
70 Id., citing Galatians 6:2. 
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Testament book of Acts, in which early Christians shared among themselves to meet 
each other’s needs.”71   
CHM’s members “share in meeting each other’s eligible medical bills up to 
$125,000 per illness.”72 CHM also operates “a separate program called Brother’s 
Keeper which enables members to share per-illness expenses up to $1 million.”73  
CHM does not reject membership applications because of age or medical 
conditions.74  “At the highest level of service in [CHM’s] main program[,] the 
financial costs are $150 per individual [and are] capped at $450 per family regardless 
of the number of immediate family members.”75  CHM staff determines whether a 
member’s medical bills are eligible for cost-sharing based on CHM’s ministry 
guidelines.76  Each member sends his or her monthly financial gifts to CHM, which 
then sends the shared reimbursement for medical bills directly to a CHM’s member – 
who pays his or her health care provider directly.77 CHM posts its financial 
information on its website through Guidestar, a service that publishes such 
information for non-profit organizations.78  
When CHM operated as the Christian Brotherhood Newsletter, each Newsletter 
contained the following disclaimer:  
I understand that the Christian Brotherhood Newsletter is a publication 
and not an insurance company. Any help I may receive will come directly 
from other subscribers and not the publisher. I understand the publisher 
will not be responsible to send me any money and will have no obligation 
to me, other than to publish medical needs members have chosen to share, 
for certain members of my family.79 I understand that the Christian 
Brotherhood program does not provide, in any way, a contract for 
indemnification of my medical expenses, death benefit or any other loss. 
No subscriber is personally responsible to send gifts to the need 
recommended to them in the newsletter. I am not guaranteed payment for 
any need of mine that is published in the newsletter. I participate 
voluntarily to practice Christian principles as the Bible teaches and to 
contribute to others' needs. I agree that I have no legal recourse against 
any subscriber or the publisher, even if I do not receive any money for 
                                                          
71 Id.   
72 Id. 
73 Id.   
74 Id.
75 Id.   
76 Id.   
77 Id.   
78 Id.  Guidestar publishes information about non-profit organizations.  See GUIDESTAR, 
http://www.guidestar.org/ (last visited April 10, 2013) (Guidestar’s report on Christian 
Healthcare Ministries is available at: http://www.guidestar.org/organizations/34-
1964742/christian-healthcare-ministries.aspx)  
79 This sentence limits CBN’s/CHM’s obligation to its members to the provision of certain 
publishing services. The following two sentences excludes indemnification by CBN, and 
excludes assumption of the risk by CBN’s membership as well.   
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needs of mine submitted for publication in the newsletter. I understand 
that no contract for indemnification involving the Christian Brotherhood 
Newsletter, staff, employees or subscribers exists.80
CHM’s current disclaimer is slightly shorter than the above disclaimer the 
ministry previously used.81
IV.  WHAT LAW APPLIES TO HCSMS? 
This section briefly summarizes the law that governs health care sharing 
ministries.  Legal challenges to HCSMs implicate two focused areas of law: the first 
being the law providing HCSMs with “safe-harbor” protections from state insurance 
regulation and the second being the law governing the nature of insurance.   
First, in over 40% of the states, HCSMs are governed by so-called “safe harbor” 
laws.82  The Alliance of Health Care Sharing Ministries explains that these laws “are 
an important legislative avenue to protecting health care sharing ministries.”83  The 
Alliance maintains that, “it is impossible” for HCSMs to meet “the same 
requirements as insurance companies . . . without destroying the voluntary, 
ministerial nature of our ministries.”84  The provisions of the safe harbor statutes 
vary slightly from state to state.  Virginia’s statutory definition of HCSMs, enacted 
in 2008, is a typical example:   
[a]s used in this chapter, “health care sharing ministry” means a health 
care cost sharing arrangement among individuals of the same religion 
based on their sincerely held religious beliefs, which arrangement is 
administered by a non-profit organization that has been granted an 
exemption from federal income taxation pursuant to § 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and that: 
                                                          
80 Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Ins. Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586 
N.W.2d 352, 353-354 (Iowa 1998).   
81 Legal Notices, CHRISTIAN HEALTHCARE MINISTRIES, http://www.cbnews.org/legal 
notices.aspx. The current online disclaimer reads: 
Christian Healthcare Ministries (hereinafter “CHM”), a not-for-profit religious 
organization, is not an insurance company. No ministry operations or publications are 
offered through or operated by an insurance company. CHM does not guarantee or 
promise that your medical bills will be shared or assigned to others for financial gifts. 
Whether any CHM member chooses to share the burden of your medical bills will be 
entirely voluntary. As such, CHM should never be considered as a substitute for an 
insurance policy. Whether you receive any financial gifts for medical expenses and 
whether CHM continues to operate, you are always liable for any unpaid bills. 
CHM also employs several state-specific legal notices. Id.   
82 E-mail from John Creath, Pub. Policy Specialist, Samaritan Ministries, to Benjamin 
Boyd (July 20, 2012, 14:49 MT) (on file with author).  As of August 2012, 21 states have 
exemptions for HCSMs.  See, e.g., Current State Issues, THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE 
SHARING MINISTRIES, http://www.healthcaresharing.org/issues/index.php?State=None; see 
infra Appendix B.   
83 Current State Issues, supra note 82. 
84 Current State Issues, supra note 82.  
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1. Limits its membership to individuals who are of a similar faith; 
2. Acts as an organizational clearinghouse for information about members 
who have financial or medical needs and matches them with members 
with the present ability to assist those with financial or medical needs, all 
in accordance with the organization's criteria; 
3. Provides for the financial or medical needs of a member through 
payments directly from one member to another. The requirements of this 
subdivision 3 may be satisfied by a trust established solely for the benefit 
of members, which trust is audited annually by an independent auditing 
firm;85
4. Provides amounts that members/subscribers may contribute with (i) no 
assumption of risk or promise to pay among the members and (ii) no 
assumption of risk or promise to pay by the organization to the members; 
5. Provides written monthly statements to all members that list the total 
dollar amount of qualified needs submitted to the organization by 
members for their contribution; and 
6. Provides in substance the following written disclaimer on or 
accompanying all promotional documents distributed by or on behalf of 
the organization, including applications and guideline materials: 
“Notice: 
This publication is not insurance, and is not offered through an insurance 
company. Whether anyone chooses to assist you with your medical bills 
will be totally voluntary, as no other member will be compelled by law to 
contribute toward your medical bills. As such, this publication should 
never be considered to be insurance. Whether you receive any payments 
for medical expenses and whether or not this publication continues to 
operate, you are always personally responsible for the payment of your 
own medical bills.”86
The next section of the Virginia Code contains the “safe harbor” for HCSMs: 
[t]he provisions of this title shall not apply to a health care sharing 
ministry. A health care sharing ministry that, through its publication to 
members, solicits funds for the payment of medical expenses of other 
members, shall not be considered to be engaging in the business of 
insurance for purposes of this title and shall not be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission.87
In contrast, the state of Washington adopted a terse safe harbor law for HCSMs: 
“[h]ealth care sharing ministries are not health carriers as defined in RCW 48.43.005 
or insurers as defined in RCW 48.01.050.  For purposes of this section, “health care 
                                                          
85 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6300 (West 2012). This provision in Virginia’s safe harbor 
statute varies from Kentucky’s “Religious Publication” exemption, KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 
304.1-120(7)(d) (If Kentucky’s statute included this clause, the Reinhold case should have 
gone the other way).   
86 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6300 (West 2012).   
87 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6301 (West 2012).   
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sharing ministry” has the same meaning as in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5000A.88  A complete 
list of the states with HCSM exemptions follows this Article in Appendix B.89   
Second, legal challenges to HCSMs historically have implicated a key legal 
concept in insurance law: the assumption of risk. The majority of states view the 
assumption of risk as an essential or foundational element of an insurance contract.90  
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted “[t]he primary elements of an insurance 
contract are the spreading and underwriting of a policyholder's risk.”91 A California 
court viewed “the element of shifting of the risk of loss” as an essential element of 
insurance.92  A Florida court stated: “[h]azard is essential . . . [i]f there is no risk, . . . 
there can be [no] insurance.”93 The Illinois Court of Appeals stated, “the presence 
of risk is the essence of an insurance contract.”94 The Kansas Supreme Court 
explained, “the assumption of a risk” is “the principal object and purpose” of the 
insurance business.95 This presence – or absence – of the “primary characteristic . . . 
of insurance” determines whether HCSMs are insurance.96  If HCSMs possess this 
                                                          
88 WASH. REV. CODE. § 48.43.009 (West 2012) (referencing the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act’s definition of health care sharing ministries, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A, 
(West 2012)).  Washington’s safe harbor statute defers to Congress’ definition of “health care 
sharing ministry” in PPACA, which arguably preempts any state legislative definition to the 
contrary. 
89 See infra Appendix B. 
90 See infra Appendix A.   
91 Carter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 808 A.2d 466, 472 (D.C. Ct. App. 2002), 
quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979); see also 
Louisiana Safety Ass'n of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund v. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 17 So. 
3d 350, n.7 (La. 2009) (stating that “[t]he primary characteristic of the business of insurance is 
the transferring or spreading of risk. So long as this characteristic is present, the business of 
insurance is not limited to traditionally recognized areas of insurance,” citing Klamath–Lake 
Pharm. Ass'n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1983)).  
92 Richardson v. GAB Bus. Serv., Inc., 207 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(citation omitted); see also, Warnig v. Atlantic Cnty. Special Serv., 833 A.2d 1098, 1104 (N.J. 
Super. 2003) (“[t]he essential nature of insurance is that risk is shifted to the insurer for the 
payment of a premium. It is a gamble.”)  
93 Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Abernathy, 93 So. 3d 352, 359 (Fla. Ct. App. 2012); 
quoting Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (“there must be a 
risk of loss to which one party may be subjected by contingent or future events and an 
assumption of it by legally binding arrangement by another. Even the most loosely stated 
conceptions of insurance and indemnity require these element[s]”). 
94 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., Inc., 694 N.E.2d 1049, 
1054 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998), citing U.S. Liability Ins. Co. v. Selman, 70 F.3d 684, 690 (1st Cir. 
1995) (“[a]ccordingly, where there is no risk of loss, as where a loss occurred prior to 
the policy taking effect, insurance ceases to serve its purpose of risk-spreading.”)
95 State ex rel. Londerholm v. Anderson, 408 P.2d 864, 875 (Kan. 1966), citing 44 C.J.S. 
Insurance § 59; see also, Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Ins. Div. of the Iowa Dept. of 
Commerce, 586 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 1998) (“to be considered insurance, the assumption 
of risk by the promoter must be the “principal object and purpose of the program,” citing
Appleman & Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 7002 at 14 (1981)).  
96 Louisiana Safety Ass'n of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund v. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 
17 So.3d 350, n.7 (La. 2009) (“[t]he primary characteristic of the business of insurance is the 
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characteristic, “the business of insurance is not limited to traditionally recognized 
areas of insurance.”97  Yet, if HCSMs lack this shifting or assumption of risk, “there 
is not an insurance contract.”98  
This Article now turns to consider how courts have regarded HCSMs, 
beginning first with the Reinhold opinion from Kentucky.   
V.  HOW HAVE COURTS TREATED HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES? 
A.  Commonwealth v. Reinhold: Medi-Share is Insurance 
The primary issue in Reinhold was “whether Medi-Share provides a contract for 
insurance . . . .”99  The Reinhold majority explained, “[t]he lower court decisions . . . 
incorrectly determined that the Medi-Share program did not shift risk because each 
individual member remains personally liable for paying his own medical bills.”100  
The Reinhold majority opined that the lower courts overlooked “the risk-shifting 
nature of the ‘commitment’ contract that [Medi-Share] members enter into . . . and 
thus the lower courts erroneously concluded that the process does not constitute a 
‘contract for insurance’ . . . .”101   
First, the Reinhold majority noted that the wording of Medi-Share’s 
“commitment” contract, standing alone, was not controlling.102  Rather, “[i]t is the 
                                                          
transferring or spreading of risk. So long as this characteristic is present, the business of 
insurance is not limited to traditionally recognized areas of insurance.”), (citing Klamath–
Lake Pharm. Ass'n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1983). 
97 Louisiana Safety Ass'n of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund, 17 So.3d at n.7.  
98 Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 420 S.E.2d 432, 435 (N.C. 1992) (“One 
characteristic of an insurance contract is the shifting of a risk from the insured to the insurer. 
If no risk is shifted there is not an insurance contract.”). 
99 Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Ky. 2010), citing KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 304.1-030 (defining insurance as “a contract whereby one undertakes to pay or 
indemnify another as to loss from certain specified contingencies or perils called ‘risks,’ or to 
pay or grant a specified amount or determinable benefit or annuity in connection with 
ascertainable risk contingencies, or to act as surety.”)  
100 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 276.   
101 Id.   
102 Id. at 277 (citing 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 4 (1982)):  
[i]t is immaterial, or at least not controlling, that the term “insurance” nowhere 
appears in the contract the nature of which is to be determined; indeed, the fact that it 
states that it is not an insurance policy is not conclusive, and a company may be found 
to be engaged in an insurance business even though it expressly disclaims any 
intention to sell insurance. Neither are the terms or mode of payment of the 
consideration determinative of the question whether the contract is one of insurance. 
The nature of a contract as one of insurance depends upon its contents and the true 
character of the contract actually entered into or issued—that is, whether a contract is 
one of insurance is to be determined by a consideration of the real character of the 
promise or of the act to be performed, and by a consideration of the exact nature of the 
agreement in light of the occurrence, contingency, or circumstances under which the 
performance becomes requisite, and not by what it is called. 
43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 4 (1982). 
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actual nature and effect of the “commitment” 103 contract that determines whether it 
is one for insurance.”104  The Kentucky Supreme Court noted: “one cannot change 
the nature of insurance business by declaring in the contract that it is not 
insurance.”105  The Reinhold majority focused on three key aspects of Medi-Share’s 
program: Medi-Share member obligations; what Medi-Share members may receive 
in return for keeping their obligations; and Medi-Share’s alleged use of actuarial 
tables.106   
As for Medi-Share’s member obligations, the commitment contract “obligates 
Medi-Share members to pay their monthly ‘share’ by the first of the month because 
their ‘fellow believers in Christ’ rely upon that payment to satisfy their medical 
needs.”107 And as to what members receive, “[i]n return for paying the monthly 
“share,” Medi-Share members remain eligible to receive payment for their medical 
needs through the program.”108 The Reinhold majority opined, 
[t]his process clearly shifts the risk of payment for medical expenses from 
the individual member to the pool of sub-accounts from which his 
expenses will be paid. Thus, regardless of how Medi-Share defines itself 
or what disclaimers it includes in its literature, in the final analysis, there 
is a shifting of risk.109
Addressing Medi-Share’s alleged use of actuarial tables, the majority analyzed 
Medi-Share’s high level of success in paying members’ claims, evidently due to the 
use of these statistical actuarial tables.110 The majority stated that Medi-Share used 
                                                          
103 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277. (quoting Wheeler v. Ben Hur Life Ass’n., 264 S.W.2d 
289, 291 (Ky. 1953)):  
[b]roadly speaking . . . when a company, society, or association, either voluntary or 
incorporated, and known as a relief, benevolent or benefit society, or by some similar 
name, contracts for a consideration to pay a sum of money upon the happening of a 
certain contingency, and the prevalent purpose and nature of the organization is that of 
insurance, it will be regarded as an insurance company, and its contracts as insurance 
contracts, regardless of the manner or mode of payment of consideration or of loss or 
benefit. 
Wheeler, 264 S.W.2d at 291. 
104 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277 (citing Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc. v. Ins. Div. of the 
Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586 N.W.2d 352 (Iowa 1998)). Interestingly, Kentucky’s Reinhold
majority cited Iowa’s Barberton decision, but reached the exact opposite conclusion as the 
Iowa Supreme Court.  Id. 
105 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting Allin v. Motorists’ Alliance of America, 29 
S.W.2d 19, 23 (Ky. 1930)). The sole question was “whether the matters and things 
enumerated in the contract … constitute the business of insurance ….” Id. at 21.   
106 Email from Stephen Sullivan, Gen. Counsel, Christian Care Ministries, Inc. (Medi-
Share), to Benjamin Boyd (Sept. 10, 2012 12:32 MT) (on file with author) (Medi-Share 
actually does not use actuarial tables to calculate member shares).   
107 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277 (emphasis original). 
108 Id.   
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
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actuarial tables to calculate each member’s monthly “share” at a “level 
commensurate with anticipated future member medical claims.”111 The majority 
believed the use of actuarial tables operated to shift risk like a traditional insurance 
company does.112 With that rationale, the majority restated their holding that Medi-
Share shifts risk between Medi-Share members “in the same manner traditional 
health insurance contracts shift risk between policyholders.”113
In response, Medi-Share argued their disclaimer indicates that no risk shifting 
occurs.114 The disclaimer states “Medi-Share takes no responsibility for the payment 
of the members’ medical bills.”115 The Reinhold majority acknowledged the 
disclaimer perhaps shields Medi-Share from “any liability for its members’ medical 
bills.”116  Nonetheless, the majority observed this disclaimer “does not overcome the 
fact that through the Medi-Share program the individual members pool resources 
together to distribute the risk of major medical bills amongst each other.”117 The 
Reinhold majority observed, “one cannot change the nature of an insurance business 
by simply declaring in the contract that it is not insurance.”118   
In sum, the Reinhold majority found that Medi-Share’s “‘commitment’ contract 
was one for insurance” under Kentucky law for two main reasons.119  First, through 
the commitment contract, Medi-Share members “undertake[] to pay or indemnify 
another as to loss from certain specified contingencies or perils called ‘risks’.”120  
Second, Medi-Share itself also “‘undertakes’ to actually pool the members' monthly 
“shares” together and pay members’ actual medical bills as claims for payment are 
submitted.”121 The Reinhold majority concluded, “[t]hus, the “commitment” contract 
is, in practice and function, one for insurance.”122
B.  Commonwealth v. Reinhold: Medi-Share Does Not Qualify 
for the Religious Publication Exemption 
Kentucky’s Supreme Court considered, secondly, assuming that Medi-Share was 
a “contract for insurance,” whether it was exempt from state regulation under 
Kentucky’s statutory Religious Publication Exception.123  The exception provides 
that no provisions of Kentucky’s Insurance Code apply to “[a] religious publication 
                                                          
111 Id.  
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Id.    
115 Id. at 278. 
116 Id. 
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
119 Id.
120 Id. (citing KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304-1-030).   
121 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 278. 
122 Id.   
123 Id. (citing KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(d)).   
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(as identified in this subsection), or its subscribers, that limit their operations to those 
activities, and . . . [p]ays for the subscribers' financial or medical needs by payments 
directly from one (1) subscriber to another . . . .”124
The Reinhold majority opined, “for Medi-Share to qualify for the Religious 
Publications Exception, it must meet every criterion listed. . . . Medi-Share does 
not.”125 The Reinhold majority found Medi-Share’s members failed to pay 
subscriber’s needs “directly from one (1) subscriber to another.”126  The Kentucky 
court reasoned, “[t]o satisfy the requirement of subsection (d), the religious 
publication must be set up so that one subscriber sends the money for assistance to 
the other subscriber without having the money passing through an intermediary.”127  
The Kentucky high court concluded “Medi-Share . . . does not qualify for the 
Religious Publication Exception.”128  
1.  The Reinhold Dissent: Medi-Share is Not Insurance 
The Reinhold dissent, authored by Justice Scott and joined by Justice 
Cunningham, believed Medi-Share was not in the business of insurance129 and 
maintained Medi-Share did not fall within “the ambit of definitional insurance.”130   
First, Justice Scott believed Medi-Share was not insurance because “the 
relationship between Medi-Share and its subscribers does not amount to a 
distribution of risk between the policy holder (the subscribers) and Medi-Share (the 
conduit to the pool of subscribers).”131 Justice Scott, quoting the U.S. Supreme 
Court, described insurance as “an arrangement for transferring and distributing 
risk”132 that “has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk.”133  The 
                                                          
124 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 278-79.   
125 Id. at 279 (citing Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 809 (Ky. 1990) (“This 
conclusion is inescapable because otherwise the General Assembly would have used the 
disjunctive ‘or’ instead of the conjunctive ‘and’”). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. Kentucky’s Supreme Court reasoned:  
Medi-Share does not operate in this manner. Medi-Share serves as an intermediary by 
which monthly “shares” from members are collected and held until being used to pay 
other members' needs. Medi-Share determines which needs are paid, how they are 
paid, and when they are paid. Each “subscribers' needs” are thus not paid directly 
from one subscriber to another, but through Medi-Share. 
Id. 
129 Id. at 280 (Scott, J., dissenting).   
130 Id.
131 Id.   
132 Id. (citing Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979)):  
[t]he primary elements of an insurance contract are the spreading and underwriting of 
a policyholder's risk. “It is characteristic of insurance that a number of risks are 
accepted, some of which involve losses, and that such losses are spread over all the 
risks so as to enable the insurer to accept each risk at a slight fraction of the possible 
liability upon it.” 
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dissent argued: “the distribution of risk between the policy holder and the insurer” is 
“central to the United States Supreme Court’s analysis of the ‘business of 
insurance.’”134  Justice Scott believed “the system set up by Medi-Share shifts the 
risk from one subscriber (the insured) to the pool of subscribers (the insurers) . . . 
.”135 The dissenting justice concluded, “Medi-Share is in the business of promoting 
and managing a cost-sharing organization . . . not . . . the business of insurance 
itself.”136   
Justice Scott explained that Medi-Share members, not the Medi-Share 
organization, bear the risk.137  The dissent based this on Medi-Share’s commitment 
contract, which states Medi-Share takes no responsibility for the payment of the 
members’ medical bills.138  Both the Reinhold majority and dissent recognized this 
disclaimer shields Medi-Share from liability for its members’ bills.139  The dissent 
pressed further: “what risk does Medi-Share, as an entity, bear? . . . clearly none.”140  
Justice Scott maintained the majority did not distinguish exactly who distributed or 
bore the risk: “the majority reasons that the contract language alone does not 
overcome ‘the fact that through the Medi-Share program the individual members 
pool resources together to distribute the risk of major medical bills amongst each 
other.’”141 Scott agreed there was a shifting of risk, but argued, “this does not 
support a legal finding that Medi-Share is in the business of insurance, but rather that 
Medi-Share is in the business of administrating and managing a cost-sharing 
organization on behalf of others—in this instance, people of faith.”142
                                                          
Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 440 U.S. at 211. 
133 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 280 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 
U.S. 724, 743 (1985)) 
[o]ur federal counterpart has identified three criteria that indicate that a company is in 
the “business of insurance”: (1) whether the practice has the effect of transferring or 
spreading a policyholder's risk; (2) whether the practice is an integral part of the 
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3) whether the practice is 
limited to entities within the insurance industry. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 743. 
134 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 280. 
135 Id.   
136 Id.   
137 Id.   
138 Id. at 274 (the Medi-Share commitment reads so:  “I further understand that all money 
comes from the voluntary giving of Members, not from the Christian Care Ministry, and that 
the Christian Care Ministry is not liable for the payment of any medical bills.”).    
139 Id. at 278, 280.   
140 Id. at 280-81.   
141 Id. at 281 (emphasis in original).   
142 Id. Justice Scott continued, “[i]n contrast, a true insurance company takes on risks and 
the company itself bears those risks, not the individually insured policy holders.”   
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Second, Justice Scott believed “Medi-Share's contract does not meet the 
definition of insurance . . . .”143  The dissent again focused on exactly who undertook 
to pay another for risks.  Justice Scott referred to Kentucky’s statutory definition of 
insurance 144 and maintained, “in order for Medi-Share to fit this definition, it would 
have to undertake to pay or indemnify another for risks, or to pay or grant a specified 
amount or to act as a surety.”145 However, the dissent concluded “Medi-Share does 
none of these . . . activities . . . assumed by the members of the pool, since each of 
them agrees to pay for the other’s losses in exchange for other members paying for 
their losses.”146   
2.  The Reinhold Dissent: If Medi-Share is Insurance, it Should Fall Under the 
Religious Publication Exemption. 
Justice Scott believed Medi-Share substantially complied with the Religious 
Publication Exemption and would have considered “it exempt from state 
regulation.”147  He reasoned, “in denying Medi-Share the protection outlined in KRS 
304.1–120(7), the majority makes much of sub-section (d), and particularly the fact 
that the subscribers of Medi-Share do not make payments directly to and from one 
another.”148 Justice Scott recognized Medi-Share’s procedure passes payments 
through an “intermediary” rather than from subscriber to subscriber, but argued “that 
procedure does not force the conclusion that the payments are not directly made 
from one subscriber to another.”149
Justice Scott reasoned that Medi-Share acts as a trustee, bank, attorney, or 
agent,150 and believed “Medi-Share is a conduit rather than an intermediary.”151  
Justice Scott argued, “this Court would not hold that simply because one acts 
through an agent or via a trustee that one has not acted in a direct manner.”152 The 
dissent noted Kentucky law impugns “upon the principal the acts of its agents as if 
they proceeded directly from the principal.”153 He reasoned that Medi-Share’s 
discretionary authority on behalf of Medi-Share’s subscribers does not make the 
actions undertaken any less direct.154 Justice Scott also believed that Kentucky’s 
                                                          
143 Id. at 281.   
144 Id. (citing Ky. Rev. St. Ann. § 304.1–030 (West 2013)).    
145 Id.  
146 Id.   
147 Id.
148 Id. at 282.   
149 Id.   
150 Id.  
151 Id.   
152 Id.  
153 Id. (quoting Preferred Risk Fire Ins. Co. v. Neet, 90 S.W.2d 39, 42 (1935)), (emphasis 
in original). 
154  Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 282.   
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Religious Publications Exemption specifically allowed this type of delegation and 
discretion in the administration of such cost-sharing organizations.155
Justice Scott concluded that “Medi-Share is in substantial compliance with KRS 
304.1–120(7) and the spirit of that rule.”156 The dissent believed the Religious 
Publication Exception’s protections should not be stripped from Medi-Share 
“because payments are made at the direction of Medi-Share after subscribers have 
delegated this duty to Medi-Share, particularly when Medi-Share already statutorily 
possesses the authority to function in an administrative capacity.”157   
This Article now turns to Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc. v. Insurance Division 
of Iowa, where the Iowa Supreme Court considered whether the “Christian 
Brotherhood Newsletter,” (CBN) which then operated under the Barberton Rescue 
Mission, was insurance under Iowa law.   
C.  Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc. v. Insurance Division of Iowa: the Christian 
Brotherhood Newsletter is Not Insurance
Iowa’s Supreme Court focused on the initial question: “[i]s this insurance?”158  In 
May 1992, Iowa’s Insurance Division “charged Barberton with selling insurance 
without a license. It requested the imposition of civil penalties and insurance 
premium taxes.”159  The Insurance Division’s final decision stated: “Barberton was 
in fact selling insurance and was subject to supervision. It found that Barberton was 
subject to payment of the premium tax under Iowa Code section 507A.9 . . . .”160  
Iowa’s Supreme Court previously stated that a contract is one for insurance if: “it 
meets the following test: one party, for compensation, assumes the risk of another; 
the party who assumes the risk agrees to pay a certain sum of money on a specified 
contingency; and the payment is made to the other party or the party's nominee.”161
Iowa’s Supreme Court noted “[i]n deciding whether a plan is insurance, its wording 
is not controlling.”162  Iowa’s Barberton court acknowledged the court should:  
look through the form of the transaction to determine whether the 
relationship of insurer and insured exists. Whether the contract is one of 
                                                          
155 Id.  KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(c) requires that the religious publication:  
[a]ct[s] as an organizational clearinghouse for information between subscribers who 
have financial, physical, or medical needs and subscribers who choose to assist with 
those needs, matching subscribers with the present ability to pay with subscribers with 
a present financial or medical need; …
KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(c) (West 2012). 
156 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 282. 
157 Id.   
158 Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Insurance Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586 
N.W.2d 352, 354 (Iowa 1998).  
159 Id.   
160 Id.   
161 Id. (quoting Iowa Contractors Workers' Comp. Group v. Iowa Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 437 
N.W.2d 909, 916 (Iowa 1989)). 
162 Id. 
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insurance must be determined from its purpose, effect, content, 
terminology, and conduct of the parties, and not from its designation 
therein, since a contract which is fundamentally one of insurance cannot 
be altered by the use or absence of words in the contract itself. The court 
must look also to the intention of the parties in making this 
determination.163
Iowa’s Insurance Division advanced two key arguments against Barberton’s 
appeal.  First, the Insurance Division argued CBN looked like insurance to the 
average consumer.164  Iowa’s Supreme Court observed, “[d]espite this obvious 
attempt to avoid insurance terminology, the insurance division says that the plan 
should be subjected to its regulation.”165  “To use an old adage, if something looks 
like a duck, quacks likes a duck, and walks like a duck, it must be a duck; this 
program is insurance, according to the insurance division.”166 Analogously, the 
Insurance Division noted “provisions in the plan, such as deductibles, exclusions, 
coverage limitations, and monthly fees, which closely parallel provisions in 
traditional health insurance policies.”167 The Insurance Division concluded that “[t]o 
the average consumer, these features make the ‘Newsletter’ look like an insurance 
policy.”168 Iowa’s Supreme Court reasoned, “[h]owever, even if a program looks like 
insurance, it is not necessarily so.”169  The Iowa Supreme Court’s principal inquiry 
here was “not how the program appears but whether the risk of payment for medical 
expense is assumed by the promoter . . . [i]n fact, to be considered insurance, the 
assumption of risk by the promoter must be the ‘principal object and purpose of the 
program.’”170   
Secondly, the Insurance Division focused on an implied assumption of risk.  The 
Insurance Division conceded CBN “expressly disavows any assumption of risk, but 
it argues that some of its written material could be interpreted as a representation that 
it would do so, thereby creating an implied agreement to assume health care 
costs.”171 The Insurance Division pointed to several representations by CBN that it 
believed “show an implied assumption of risk.”172 These representations were in a 
                                                          
163 Id. at 354-55 (quoting Iowa Contractors, 437 N.W.2d 909, 916, supra at n. 159 (further 
citations omitted)).   
164 Id at 354. 
165 Id. at 355.   
166 Id. 
167 Id.  
168 Id.
169 Id.   
170 Id. (quoting APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 7002, at 14 (1981) (further 
internal citations omitted)). 
171 Id. (citing Irons v. Community State Bank, 461 N.W.2d 849, 855 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) 
(implying contract arising from conduct of parties)).  The majority in Reinhold read Medi-
Share’s commitment contract very much like Iowa’s Insurance Division here read CBN’s 
representations – to create an implied assumption of risk where the HCSM specifically denies 
any assumption of risk.   
172 Id. at 355.  
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form letter sent to CBN’s subscribers who had not received payments from other 
subscribers and in the organization’s informational materials furnished to 
prospective members.173 The form letters sent to subscribers stated: “[t]he home 
office has paid for all members that have dropped our program this year. But if 
someone does not pay we need that information in order for the home office to pay 
for them.”174 In response, Iowa’s Supreme Court reasoned, “[t]his statement provides 
only limited support for the division's position, however, because . . . the actual cost 
is likely borne by another member.”175 The Barberton court reached this finding 
because another form letter from CBN accompanied the checks for unmet needs 
where a member did not pay.176  This second form letter indicated: “[a] new joiner is 
filling their place and paying this need.”177  In addition, the Newsletter furnished the 
following answers to general questions: “[q]uestion: WHAT HAPPENS IF 
SOMEONE DOES NOT SEND THEIR GIFT?”178  CBN provided this answer: “[i]f 
someone does not send their check, you alert the home office and we send them 
three reminders. If they do not pay after the third reminder, they are dropped from 
the program and the gift will be filled by a new member.”179  The Iowa Supreme 
Court reasoned this material bore out the company’s non-assumption of risk.180   
Iowa’s Insurance Division also relied on other “frequently asked questions” in 
the Newsletter’s informational material, and argued the following was an implied 
promise to pay:181
[q]uestion: WHAT AM I PROMISED FROM THE BROTHERHOOD? 
Nothing, but in the last 10 years all needs that qualified [and were] 
submitted to the Brotherhood for publication [have] had a 100% 
response.182
Iowa’s Supreme Court disagreed: “[t]he company's statement does not promise to 
pay anything from its own funds. In any event, any payment by the company for a 
shortfall would be rare.”183 In addition, subscribers to the Newsletter had an amazing 
non-payment rate of only one-half of one percent.184  The Supreme Court observed 
that “even if the company paid one-half of one percent of the claims, any assumption 
                                                          
173 Id. at 355-56.   
174 Id. at 355.   
175 Id.   
176 Id.   
177 Id. (emphasis in original).   
178 Id.  
179 Id. at 355-56 (emphasis in original).   
180 Id. at 355.   
181 Id. at 356.  
182 Id.
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of risk that small could not be the ‘principal object and purpose’ of the agreement as 
required for it to be insurance.”185   
Iowa’s Supreme Court opined, “[t]his is a case in which the insurance division 
seeks to superimpose on all agreements an assumption of risk that is expressly 
disavowed by the agreement itself.”186  The Iowa court concluded the Newsletter’s 
plan “is not insurance,”187 and held that Iowa’s Insurance Division “failed to 
establish the key element of insurance, the assumption of risk.”188  As Iowa’s 
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling on the above grounds, the Court 
found it is unnecessary to consider whether Iowa’s statutory exemption for religious 
publications applied.189   
VI.  HOW SHOULD COURTS AND STATE REGULATORS TREAT HCSMS?  
This Article now turns to examine how courts and state insurance regulators 
should treat HCSMs and argues that HCSMs should be treated as follows.  
• First, courts and insurance regulators must recognize the legal 
problems that crop up when one equates HCSMs with insurance, 
evident in the Reinhold majority opinion.   
• Second, courts and insurance regulators must recognize the 
logical problems that occur when one equates an HCSM with 
insurance, also evident in the Reinhold majority opinion.     
• Third, given the general dearth of case law on HCSMs,190 when 
faced with these issues, courts and insurance regulators should 
apply HCSM “safe harbor” statutes and standard insurance law.    
• Fourth, courts and insurance regulators should protect HCSMs 
and their members under the freedom of religion, the freedom to 
contract, and the separation of powers doctrine. Courts and 
insurance regulators should defer to state Attorney General 
supervision of HCSMs as non-profit charitable organizations.  In 
addition, PPACA’s definition of health care sharing ministries 
most likely preempts state legislative definitions to the contrary.   
A.  Recognize the Legal Difficulties of Equating HCSMs with Insurance
So, how should courts legally treat HCSMs?  First and foremost, courts should 
recognize the legal distinction between a definitional HCSM and definitional 
insurance. Over 40% of the states define HCSMs in some way and exempt them 
                                                          
185 Id. (citing APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 7002, at 14 (1981) (further internal 
citations omitted)).  
186 Id. (emphasis original). 
187 Id. at 357.   
188 Id. at 356-57.  
189 Id.   
190 Id. at 353-54 (this dearth of case law evidently is by design.  CBN’s contract requires 
the subscribers to agree, “I have no legal recourse against any subscriber or the publisher, 
even if I do not receive any money for needs of mine submitted for publication in the 
newsletter.”).   
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from insurance regulations.191 As is evident from Virginia and Kentucky’s “safe 
harbor” statutes, these religious publication statutes define HCSMs quite differently 
from insurance.192 When a court fails to recognize the differences between an HCSM 
and insurance, problems arise. There are a number of legal problems with the 
Reinhold majority’s legal rationale.    
First, the foundational legal problem in Reinhold’s majority opinion lies in the 
omission of any reference to the legal standards governing the interpretation of 
insurance contracts.  If Medi-Share’s commitment contract is a type of insurance, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court should have construed the Medi-Share commitment 
contract according to the law governing the interpretation of insurance contracts.  
Kentucky construes insurance contracts with these standards of law:  
[t]erms of insurance contracts have no technical meaning in law and are to 
be interpreted according to the usage of the average man and as they 
would be read and understood by him in the light of the prevailing rule 
that uncertainties and ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the 
insured. But this ‘rule of strict construction against an insurance company 
certainly does not mean that every doubt must be resolved against it and 
does not interfere with the rule that the policy must receive a reasonable 
interpretation consistent with ... the plain meaning and/or language in the 
contract.’ When the terms of an insurance contract are unambiguous and 
not unreasonable, they will be enforced.193
The Reinhold majority apparently disregarded these laws of interpretation when 
it decided that Medi-Share’s “process” constituted insurance.  First, the Reinhold
court did not interpret Medi-Share’s commitment contract “according to the usage of 
the average man,”194 as it “would be read and understood by him.”  The “average 
man” here should not be the average insurance purchaser.  Rather, the “average 
man” must be a Medi-Share member, who voluntarily agreed in the Medi-Share 
commitment contract “that Christian Care Ministry (CCM) matches a Medi-Share 
member’s medical need with other Members who have volunteered, in faith, to share 
in meeting needs through the biblical concept of Christian mutual sharing.”195  
Secondly, the Reinhold court did not give the commitment contract “a reasonable 
interpretation consistent with . . . the plain meaning and/or language in the 
contract.”196 How would “the usage of the average man” give a “reasonable 
interpretation” of the plain meaning of Medi-Share’s disclaimer?   
                                                          
191 See infra Appendix B; see also, What is a Health Care Sharing Ministry?, THE 
ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, http://www.healthcaresharing.org/hcsm 
(providing a brief description and key features of an HCSM).   
192  See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6300 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6301 (2008); KY. REV. 
ST. ANN. § 301.1-120(7)(d) (West 2012). 
193 Kentucky Ass'n of Cntys All Lines Fund Trust v. McClendon, 157 S.W.3d 626, 630 
(Ky. 2005) (citations omitted) (some internal quotation marks omitted). 
194 Id.   
195 Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272, 274 (Ky. 2010).  
196 McClendon, 157 S.W.3d at 630.   
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ATTENTION – This publication does not guarantee or promise that your 
medical bills will be published or assigned to others for payment.  
Whether anyone chooses to pay your medical bills is strictly voluntary.197   
The meaning of this language is plain, unless a court seeks to find an assumption 
of risk and obligation where Medi-Share’s contract language expressly disavows 
such.198 Thirdly, in order to evade enforcing the Medi-Share contract as written, the 
Reinhold majority impliedly found the Medi-Share contract ambiguous and 
unreasonable.  If Medi-Share indeed functions as a type of insurance, why did the 
Reinhold majority neglect to interpret Medi-Share’s contract according to standard 
law governing the interpretation of insurance contracts?  Further, if Medi-Share’s 
contract was ambiguous and uncertain, the Kentucky Supreme Court certainly did 
not resolve those difficulties in favor of the alleged insureds – Medi-Share’s 
members who voluntarily agreed to Medi-Share’s contract.  The bottom line is the 
Reinhold majority ignored the plain meaning of the Medi-Share contract – a contract 
that requires the conclusion reached by the Reinhold dissent and by Kentucky’s 
Court of Appeals: Medi-Share is not insurance.199  In conclusion, courts should give 
effect to HCSM member agreements and construe these agreements according to 
standard contract law.   
The second legal problem – and it springs from the first – lies with the majority’s 
failure to explain exactly how the language of “the commitment contract . . . 
obligates Medi-Share members to pay their monthly share.”200 Pollock’s century-old 
observation is right on target: “[a]n unfortunate habit has arisen of using ‘obligation’ 
in a lax manner as co-extensive with duties of every kind.”201 Black’s Dictionary 
defines obligation as “[a] legal or moral duty to do or not do something.”202  The 
Medi-Share commitment contract requires members to agree: “all money comes 
from the voluntary giving of Members.”203  Further, Medi-Share’s disclaimer states, 
“[t]his publication does not guarantee or promise that your medical bills will be 
published or assigned to others for payment.  Whether anyone chooses to pay your 
medical bills is strictly voluntary.”204 In other words, Medi-Share members agree 
                                                          
197 Id.   
198 Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Ins. Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586 
N.W.2d 352, 356 (Iowa 1998) (in the words of the Iowa Supreme Court: “this is a case in 
which the insurance division seeks to superimpose on all agreements an assumption of risk 
that is expressly disavowed by the agreement itself”).   
199  See Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 280 (Scott, J., dissenting). 
200 Id. at 277 (emphasis added).   
201 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST
BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 82 (1896)).   
202 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (8th ed. 2004).   
203 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d. at 274.   
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their monthly share is either a strictly voluntary or a moral obligation, not a legal 
obligation or contractual guarantee.205    
The Reinhold majority, however, reasoned that the contract obligated members to 
pay their monthly share because fellow believers in Christ “rely on that payment.”206  
The majority’s appeal to fellow believers relying on payment does not suggest a 
legal obligation, but rather a moral obligation.  If the commitment contract features a 
legal obligation to assume the risk, then Medi-Share should have the right to compel 
members to pay shares when there is a shortfall.  However, the Reinhold majority 
never suggested that Medi-Share’s contract is legally enforceable for that purpose. If 
the majority construed the commitment contract as its stands, they would give effect 
to the plain language that disavows any guarantee of payment, rather than importing 
a non-existent member “obligation” through the presence of the word “rely.”  Thus, 
the Reinhold majority’s reasoning is unclear.   
Perhaps the Kentucky Supreme Court considered Medi-Share’s commitment 
contract somewhat like a promissory estoppel, based on detrimental reliance.207 In a 
promissory estoppel action, detrimental reliance serves as a substitute for 
consideration.208 However, the legal doctrine of consideration often denies 
“enforcement to a promise to make a gift.”209 Medi-Share’s members promise to 
                                                          
205 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 202 (defining a moral obligation as, “[a] duty 
that is based only on one’s conscience and that is not legally enforceable; an obligation with a 
purely moral basis, as opposed to a legal one”). 
206 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277. 
207 McCarthy v. Louisville Cartage Co., 796 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (citing THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1965)) (“[a] promise which the promisor 
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third 
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise.”). 
208 Id. at 12, citing CALAMARI AND PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, ch.6, § 99-§ 105 
(Hornbook Series, 1970) (“[n]umerous oral and gratuitous promises have been enforced on 
this basis”). 
209
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 90 cmt. f (1981) (comment f explains: 
“[s]uch a promise is ordinarily enforced by virtue of the promisee's reliance only if his 
conduct is foreseeable and reasonable and involves a definite and substantial change of 
position which would not have occurred if the promise had not been made.”).  Here, the 
doctrine of consideration would deny legal enforcement of Medi-Share’s members’ voluntary 
choice, or “obligation” to make a gift of their “share.”  First, if some Medi-Share members 
relied on other members’ promises to make a voluntary gift, their conduct, perhaps 
foreseeable, would not be reasonable.  Medi-Share members specifically agree: “I understand 
that . . . other Members . . . have volunteered, in faith, to share in meeting needs through the 
biblical concept of Christian mutual sharing.  I further understand that all money comes from 
the voluntary giving of Members . . . .” Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 278.  How would members 
reasonably rely on other members’ promises, when Medi-Share’s disclaimer states: “Whether 
anyone chooses to pay your medical bills is strictly voluntary.”  How could reliance be 
reasonable when Medi-Share’s disclaimer warns: “Whether or not you receive any payments 
for medical expenses and whether or not this publication continues to operate, you are 
responsible for payment of your own medical bills?”  Second, there can be no “definite and 
substantial change of position” if Medi-Share’s members are the ones ultimately “responsible 
for payment of your own medical bills.”  Simply, if the theory of promissory estoppel or 
detrimental reliance lurked behind the Reinhold majority rationale, the facts simply do not 
support that theory.    
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make voluntary gifts and the doctrine of consideration should deny legal 
enforcement of an HCSM member’s “promise” to make a gift.  In essence, the 
Reinhold majority imported this member obligation based upon reliance into the 
Medi-Share contract. The contract specifically denies this type of member 
obligation.210  The court’s very loose reading of the Medi-Share contract underscores 
the first lesson: courts must give legal effect to the language of HCSM member 
contracts.   
A third legal problem with the Reinhold majority lies in a failure to explain just 
how a “process” could “clearly” shift the risk of payment.  Kentucky law requires 
the contract to shift the risk.  Insurance is “a contract whereby one undertakes to pay 
or indemnify another as to loss from certain specified contingencies or perils called 
‘risks,’ . . . .”211  The Reinhold majority reasoned, “[i]n return for paying their 
monthly “share,” Medi-Share members remain eligible to receive payment for their 
medical needs through the program.”212  Then, the majority declared, “[t]his process 
clearly shifts the risk of payment for medical expenses from the individual member 
to the pool of sub-accounts from which his expenses will be paid.”213 The majority 
failed to explain just how a process morphs into an insurance contract.  Unlike a 
contractual shifting of risk, Medi-Share’s “process” is a clearinghouse system by 
which the ministry distributes the members’ voluntary gifts.214  Simply, how can this 
process shift risks to a “pool of sub-accounts” when the members have no 
contractual obligation “to pay or indemnify another as to loss,” but only a voluntary, 
moral obligation?     
The fourth legal problem consists in the Reinhold majority’s failure to identify 
the insurer in the Medi-Share’s alleged insurance “process.” In Kentucky, the word 
“‘[i]nsurer’ includes every person engaged as principal and as indemnitor, surety, or 
contractor in the business of entering into contracts of insurance.”215  Kentucky’s 
statutory definition of insurance requires the insurer to “undertake[] to pay or 
indemnify” the insured.216 However, the majority believed Medi-Share’s process 
“shifts risk of payment . . . from the individual member to the pool of sub-accounts . 
. . .”217 The majority believed the individual members “distribute[d] the risk of major 
medical bills amongst each other.”218 However, Kentucky’s definition of “insurer” 
does not include “the pool of sub-accounts” or the “individual members” of a 
HCSM.  The majority’s reasoning raises a few questions, which follow:    
• First, are Medi-Share’s individual members now “insurers” 
under the Reinhold majority opinion? Under Kentucky’s 
                                                          
210 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 278. 
211 KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1-030 (West 2012) (emphasis added).   
212 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277. 
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215 KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1-040 (West 2012).  
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217 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277.   
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definition of “insurer,” Medi-Share’s individual members are not 
“engaged as principal . . . or contractor in the business of 
entering into contracts of insurance.”219  This conclusion does 
not legally follow. 
• Second, is Medi-Share as an organization the “insurer” under the 
Reinhold majority opinion? The majority did not conclude Medi-
Share was the insurer. The majority stated, “[t]he conclusion that 
Medi–Share functions not as a charity, but as a type of insurance 
is well supported by the evidence in the record.”220  In what 
sense could Medi-Share as an organization “function . . . as a 
type of insurance?”  Kentucky law defines insurance as a 
contract, not an organization, and not as a function or process.221   
• Third, did the Reinhold majority decision create a new type of 
insurance? It appears that with Medi-Share’s “process” based 
“insurance,” insurance exists without an insurer, at least in 
Kentucky.  Does any type of insurance exist that distributes the 
risk amongst policyholders (or Medi-Share members), but does 
not shift the risk of payment to Medi-Share, the alleged 
“insurer?” The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia reasoned, “[i]nsurance . . . involves distribution of the 
risk, but distribution without assumption hardly can be held to be 
insurance. These are elemental conceptions and controlling 
ones.”222  Thus, insurance normally consists of five elements: “1) 
[a]n insurable interest; 2) [a] risk of loss; 3) [a]n assumption of 
risk by the insurer; 4) [a] general scheme to distribute the loss 
among the larger group of persons bearing similar risks” and “5) 
[t]he payment of a premium for the assumption of risk.”223  The 
Reinhold majority focused on one element: the distribution of the 
risk.224  It is noteworthy what the majority did not find in Medi-
Share’s process: Medi-Share as an “insurer” does not assume the 
risk, and Medi-Share’s members do not pay a premium for Medi-
Share to assume the risk.  
• Fourth, does Kentucky’s new “process” type of insurance also 
“perhaps” shield Medi-Share, the insurer, from any liability for 
the “insured’s” medical bills?  The Reinhold majority grudgingly 
acknowledged Medi-Share’s disclaimer “perhaps” shields the 
HCSM from “any liability for its members’ medical bills.”225  
                                                          
219 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-040 (West 2012). 
220 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 278. 
221 KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1-030 (West 2012). 
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223 Guaranteed Warranty Corp., Inc. v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 533 P.2d 87, 90 (Ariz. Ct. 
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224 See Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 276-278. 
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However, the Reinhold majority ignored the effect of Medi-
Share’s disclaimer, as the dissent charged.226 Whether Medi-
Share’s disclaimer does shield the HCSM from liability for its 
members’ medical bills, or only “perhaps” shields Medi-Share 
from liability for such, Medi-Share’s need-sharing process 
“hardly can be held to be insurance.”227  
In conclusion, the legal problems noted above will be manifest when a court or 
administrative officer seeks to squeeze an HCSM into the relevant definition of 
insurance.  These legal problems lead to certain logical problems, which this Article 
turns to now.   
B.  Recognize the Logical Difficulties Of Equating HCSMs with Insurance
Now, how should courts logically treat HCSMs?  This Article argues that courts 
should apply the basic laws of logic to HCSM cases.  The Reinhold majority opinion 
ably demonstrates the logical briar patches awaiting when a court overlays the 
definition of insurance on an HCSM.  The first briar patch features the logical fallacy 
of equivocation, which occurs when one reasons, “just because the same word or 
form of the same word is used in two different contexts, it must mean the same thing 
in both contexts.”228 The Reinhold majority took a description of Medi-Share’s 
escrow account system and equivocated that with the definition of insurance, so: 
“Medi-Share ‘undertakes’ to actually pool the members' monthly ‘shares’ together 
and pay the actual medical bills as claims for payment are submitted.”229  First, when 
a HCSM “undertakes” to “pay,” it does not mean the same thing as in an insurance 
company undertakes to pay medical bills.  HCSMs pay medical bills from member 
shares; insurance companies pay medical bills from their own cash reserves.230  
Second, on a more basic level, pooling member shares in escrow-type accounts and 
paying medical bills from those accounts is simply not part of Kentucky’s definition 
of insurance.  With this, the majority of Kentucky’s Supreme Court essentially re-
wrote Kentucky’s statutory definition of insurance.  This highlights an obvious 
question – if the court had to equivocate and effectively re-write the definition of 
insurance in order for a HCSM to be found “insurance,” shouldn’t the opposite 
conclusion be reached?   
In another example of equivocation, the Reinhold majority’s recitation of the 
facts referred to Medi-Share’s trust sub-accounts as “sub-accounts designated by 
individual member;” “another member’s sub-account;” “member sub-accounts;” 
“individual sub-account[s];” and twice as “his sub-account.”231 The majority even 
                                                          
226 Id. at 277-78.   
227 Jordan, 107 F.2d at 245.   
228 Regester v. Longwood Ambulance Co., Inc., 751 A.2d 694, 700 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2000); see also, State v. Star Enter., 691 So. 2d 1221, 1226 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (defining the 
logical fallacy of equivocation as “an argument in which one term, in this case “exemption,” is 
used with differences of meaning, often very subtle”).   
229 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 278. 
230 43 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 1 (2013). 
231 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 275.   
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described the “sub-accounts function[ing] in many ways like an escrow account.”232  
However, in the legal analysis, the Reinhold majority opinion never described Medi-
Share’s trust sub-accounts as “individual sub-accounts,” or “sub-accounts designated 
by individual member,” but instead characterized these accounts as “the pool of sub-
accounts.”233  Somehow, Medi-Share’s individual trust accounts lost their individual 
status between the recitation of the facts and the opinion. The majority stated that 
Medi-Share “pool[s] the members' monthly ‘shares’” and further, Medi-Share’s 
“individual members pool resources together.”234  The Reinhold majority never 
explained exactly how “sub-accounts designated by individual member” that 
function “like an escrow account” could morph subtly into this “pool of sub-
accounts” – a pool that entirely escaped mention in the majority’s recitation of the 
facts.  Indeed, if Medi-Share places member gifts directly into “sub-accounts 
designated by individual member,” like escrow accounts, it would seem Medi-Share 
actually would meet every part of Kentucky’s Religious Publication statute, as the 
Reinhold dissent maintained.   
The second briar patch involves the logical fallacy of composition.  This logical 
fallacy occurs when one infers that what is true of the parts is therefore also true of 
the whole.235 The Kentucky Court of Appeals elsewhere stated this fallacy: 
“[b]ecause the atoms of this book are invisible, the book must be invisible.”236  In 
essence, the Reinhold majority reasoned that because Medi-Share’s members assume 
the risk, Medi-Share as an entity assumes the risk.  The majority committed the 
fallacy of composition by equating Medi-Share’s members with the singular “one” 
who “undertakes to pay or indemnify another.”237  Kentucky defines insurance as: “a 
contract whereby one undertakes to pay or indemnify another as to loss from certain 
specified contingencies or perils called ‘risks,’ . . . .”238 Reinhold’s majority opined: 
“Medi-Share's members “undertake[] to pay or indemnify another as to loss from 
certain specified contingencies or perils called ‘risks'.”239 Yet, concerning the 
members, Medi-Share’s contract states: “all money comes from the voluntary giving 
                                                          
232 Id.  
233 Id. at 277 (emphasis added).   
234 Id. at 278.   
235 See, e.g., Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1469 (9th Cir.1994) (Trott, C.J., concurring and 
dissenting):  
[t]hird, the fallacy of composition is mischievously at work insofar as each 
emasculated and quarantined piece of the whole is used to compel an adulterated and 
invalid conclusion. If this were a proper way to reason, which it manifestly is not, one 
could easily make the case that World War II wasn't really a significant threat to our 
national security, just as the majority opinion claims Chew's behavior that afternoon 
did not pose an “ immediate safety threat to anyone.” 
236 A & A Mech., Inc. v. Thermal Equip. Sales, Inc., 998 S.W.2d 505, 514 n.6 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1999) (“[l]ogicians refer to such invalid inferences from parts to whole as the fallacy of 
composition: Because the atoms of this book are invisible, the book must be invisible.”).    
237 KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1-030 (West 2012) (emphasis added).   
238 Id. 
239 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3dat 278.   
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of Members . . . .”240  Further: “[w]hether anyone chooses to pay your medical bills 
is strictly voluntary.”241 Concerning Medi-Share, the contract states: “I further 
understand that all money comes from the voluntary giving of Members, not from 
the Christian Care Ministry, and that the Christian Care Ministry is not liable for the 
payment of any medical bills . . . .”242  The Reinhold dissent and majority believed 
Medi-Share’s members assumed the risk.  However, the majority’s conclusion – that 
Medi-Share functions as a type of insurance – does not follow.  Thus, what the 
majority believed was true of Medi-Share’s members (the parts) – that they assumed 
the risk – is not therefore also true of Medi-Share (the whole).243  
The third briar patch features the fallacy of special pleading, which is “[a]n 
argument that is unfairly slanted toward the speaker’s viewpoint because it omits 
unfavorable facts or authorities and develops only favorable ones.”244  The Reinhold
majority simply omitted nearly all the unfavorable facts and authorities and 
developed only the arguments sufficient to reach their desired conclusion, thus 
committing this logical fallacy. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, in an analogous situation, described this fallacy as “looking only at the 
risk element, to the exclusion of all others present or their subordination to it.”245  In 
particular, why was the Reinhold majority unwilling to acknowledge the legal effect 
of Medi-Share’s disclaimer and Medi-Share’s substantial compliance with 
Kentucky’s religious publication statute?  The majority reluctantly admitted when 
saying that, “[t]his disclaimer, while perhaps shielding Medi–Share from any 
liability for its members' medical bills . . . .”246  The Reinhold dissent pointed this 
out: “the majority discards this disclaimer under the guise that Medi-Share's function 
overrides the contract language.”247  The dissent then impliedly charged the majority 
with rendering the religious publication statute that required the disclaimer a 
                                                          
240 Id. at 274.   
241 Id.   
242 Id. 
243 Apply the majority’s reasoning to standard insurance. It highlights the logical 
difficulties. The purchasers of insurance, (the parts) the “insured[s]” do not “undertake[] to 
pay or indemnify another as to loss . . . .” Id. at 278. Rather, it is insurance companies (the 
“whole”) that undertake to pay or indemnify others as to loss, and not the purchasers of 
insurance, the insured[s] (the parts).   
244 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (9th ed. 2009). 
245 Jordan v. Gr Health Ass’n., 107 F.2d 239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (“[t]he fallacy is in 
looking only at the risk element, to the exclusion of all others present or their subordination to 
it. The question turns, not on whether risk is involved or assumed, but on whether that or 
something else to which it is related in the particular plan is its principal object and 
purpose.”). 
246 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 278.   
247 Id. at 281 n.1.  
And while I believe that an insurance company may not disclaim its insurance 
function simply by employing a disclaimer in its policies, I also recognize that the 
General Assembly, in passing this statute, considers the disclaimer more pertinent 
than a normal one used by a non-religious institution. Otherwise, subsection (f) 
becomes superfluous, and will be read as an irrelevant section of Kentucky law. Id. 
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superfluous and irrelevant section of Kentucky law.248 Medi-Share’s disclaimer 
states:  
ATTENTION—This publication is not issued by an insurance company, 
nor is it offered through an insurance company. This publication does not 
guarantee or promise that your medical bills will be published or assigned 
to others for payment.  Whether anyone chooses to pay your medical bills 
is strictly voluntary. This publication should never be considered a 
substitute for an insurance policy. Whether or not you receive any 
payments for medical expenses and whether or not this publication 
continues to operate, you are responsible for payment of your own 
medical bills.249
Medi-Share’s disclaimer – one the Kentucky legislature requires such health care 
sharing ministries to publish prominently250 – simply knocks out the Reinhold
majority’s apparent straw man member that “relies” on other member’s obligation.  
Indeed, the majority’s argument “is unfairly slanted” toward their “viewpoint 
because it omits unfavorable facts or authorities and develops only favorable 
ones.”251   
The fourth and last logical briar patch features the fallacy of guilt by 
association.252  The Reinhold majority committed this fallacy by citing certain 
egregious examples from insurance case law and comparing them with HCSMs.253  
The fallacy occurs by reasoning that if HCSMs “hang out” with insurance scams, 
then HCSMs must be insurance scams.254  Admittedly, employing this fallacy makes 
the legal analysis concerning HCSMs easier and shorter.  However, arguing for guilt 
by association does not properly bring HCSMs under the laws of insurance, just as 
hanging out in a crack house does not thereby a drug dealer make.255   
The Kentucky Supreme Court cited law256 from Allin v. Motorists’ Alliance of 
America, where the question was whether “the contract . . . constitute[s] the business 
of insurance . . . .”257  The Alliance solicited auto owners to enter into contracts in 
which the Alliance promised to provide for the costs of certain legal services.258  The 
Alliance agreed to provide legal services for charges such as manslaughter, reckless 
                                                          
248 Id.   
249 Id. at 274.     
250 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-120 (West 2012). 
251 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (9th ed. 2009).  
252 Walker v. Commonwealth, 52 S.W.3d 533, 539 (Ky. 2001) (“[n]o doubt this plethora of 
evidence was presented in an effort to inflame the jury, and convict Walker of guilt by 
association. He was hanging out in a “crack house,” therefore he must be a drug dealer.”).   
253 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277. 
254 Id.; see also Walker v. Commonwealth, 52 S.W.3d at 539.  
255  Walker, 52 S.W.3d at 539.     
256 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277. 
257 Allin v. Motorists’ Alliance of Am., 29 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Ky. Ct. App. 1930). 
258 Id. at 20.   
252 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 26:219 
driving, collisions, and personal injury.259  However, the contract disclaimer stated: 
“[t]his contract is not one of indemnity or insurance . . . .”260  The Allin appellee 
pointed out that “the contract . . . states . . . it is not an insurance policy.”261  The 
Kentucky Court of Appeals responded, “[n]o one can change the nature of insurance 
business by declaring in the contract that it is not insurance.”262 The court further 
observed, “[i]t is not good logic to argue that the furnishing of an attorney to 
represent the owner of an automobile in his defense in court actions is not a loss 
indemnified against. Insurance companies are authorized to indemnify against such 
losses . . . .”263  In short, “no one would argue that it was not insurance.”264  The 
Allin court determined “the provision of the contract to provide for services of an 
attorney, free of charge upon the happening of certain contingencies, is insurance . . . 
.”265  The Allin court believed “[t]he essential purpose” of “the contract in 
controversy” was “not to render personal services, but to indemnify against loss and 
damage resulting from the defense of actions.”266   
The Reinhold court also cited the particularly egregious case of Wheeler v. Ben 
Hur Life Association,267 where Kentucky’s Court of Appeals considered “whether 
the Association was in effect an insurance company . . . .”268  The Association had 
been licensed as a fraternal benefit society exempt from Kentucky’s insurance 
laws.269  The Wheeler court noted, however, that “the law looks at substance instead 
of form, and is not deceived by the gloss of words.”270 The Association provided for 
a lodge system, ritualistic forms of work, and a representative form of government; 
had no capital stock; and organized ostensibly for the benefit of its members.271  
However, the Association had “been engaged in the life insurance business” while 
giving only superficial attention to lodge requirements.272 The agents received 
salaries and commissions on premiums; commissions were based on sales, not the 
                                                          
259 Id. at 20-21.     
260 Id. at 21. The disclaimer continued: “and this Alliance is not responsible for any court 
costs or damages recovered against the owner or expenses incurred in connection with the 
litigation, except the services of the Alliance's attorney.” Id.
261 Id. at 23.   
262 Id. at 22. 
263 Id.   
264 Id.   
265 Id. at 23.  
266 Id. at 21.   
267 Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Ky. 2010).   
268 Wheeler v. Ben Hur Life Ass’n, 264 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953). 
269 Compare Id. at 290, with K.R.S. § 304.1-120 (West 2012), which states, “[n]o provision 
of this code shall apply to: (1) Fraternal benefit societies (as identified in Subtitle 29), except 
as stated in Subtitle 29.” KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1-120 (West 2012).   
270 Wheeler, 264 S.W.2d at 291.   
271 Id.   
272 Id.  
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number of members procured; the Association’s efforts were directed toward selling 
insurance, not recruiting members; and the Association placed little emphasis on 
lodge membership.273  The Association performed their “ritualistic work . . . 
perfunctorily.”274 No members had been initiated since 1941; lodge meetings were 
held without notice; and the lodge conducted little or no solicitation of social 
members and desired only insured members.275  The Kentucky Court of Appeals 
concluded that “the primary function of the Ben Hur Life Association is to sell 
insurance, and that the Association was an insurance company operating under the 
guise of a fraternal benefit society.”276  
The essential facts of Allin and Wheeler differ significantly from Reinhold.  In 
Allin, the “Alliance” specifically agreed to provide for the costs of legal services if a 
member faced certain charges.277  In contrast, Medi-Share as an organization agrees 
to provide no payment when Medi-Share subscribers face certain medical costs.278  
The “commitment” contract obligates Medi-Share to provide certain services to its 
members, but not indemnification or payment.279  Thus, the facts of Allin require the 
opposite conclusion: Medi-Share promises or guarantees no payment; therefore, 
Medi-Share is not insurance.  The Ben Hur Life Association in the Wheeler case is a 
false analogy to Medi-Share, which was engaged in all of its statutorily required 
duties as a HCSM under Kentucky’s “Religious Publication” statute, save one.  In 
contrast, the Ben Hur Life Association in Wheeler was only superficially engaged in 
its statutorily required duties as a fraternal lodge.280  Under these facts, the Reinhold
majority would be hard pressed to maintain “the primary function of [Medi-Share] is 
to sell insurance, and that [Medi-Share] was an insurance company operating under 
the guise of a [health care sharing ministry].”281
In sum, if the law looks at substance instead of form,282 then Medi-Share in 
substance is a HCSM under Kentucky law, not an insurance company.  Not only do 
cases like Allin and Wheeler invoke the fallacy of guilt by association, such cases are 
a red herring, a logical distraction from the real legal issues involved in cases on 
HCSMs.283 The substantive legal issue for HCSMs is whether the ministry complies 
with the applicable “safe harbor” statute under state law which this Article examines 
below in §4.B.2.  In conclusion, the laws of logic should not be somehow suspended 
for court cases and administrative actions regarding HCSMs.  The Reinhold majority 
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277 Allin v. Motorists’ Alliance of Am., 29 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Ky. Ct. App. 1930). 
278 Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272, 278 (Ky. 2010). 
279 Id. at 281 (Scott, J., dissenting). 
280 Wheeler, 264 S.W.2d at 292. 
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283 State v. Long, 575 A.2d 435, 476 (N.J. 1990) (“[t]he dictionary defines a “red herring” 
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opinion contains several examples of the defective logic involved in trying to equate 
an HCSM within the definition of insurance, and both the courts and state regulators 
would do well to avoid such logical thickets.     
C.  What to Do With the Dearth of Case Law on HCSMs
The general dearth of case law on HCSMs means the Kentucky Supreme Court 
dealt with HCSMs by making analogies to certain egregious cases involving other 
agencies, as noted above. Interestingly, the Reinhold majority did cite Iowa’s 
Barberton case, the only other reported case on point.284  The Reinhold majority did 
not distinguish Barberton’s holding or explain why the Reinhold case required the 
opposite result.  However, no other reported cases deal with the specific issues of 
whether HCSMs are engaged in the business of insurance and whether the “safe 
harbor” statute applies.285  In order to deal with this lack of case law, this Article first 
examines precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court, secondly argues that courts 
should apply the “safe harbor” statutes to HCSMs, and lastly offers some analysis on 
whether HCSMs should be compared to other types of organizations to determine 
whether HCSMs are insurance, as the Kentucky Supreme Court did.   
1.  Some Guidance from U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
The assumption of the risk is a key element for insurance.286  The key question 
here is, given the fact HCSMs specifically disclaim any assumption of the risk, 
whether HCSM members indeed assume the risk of payment of medical costs among 
themselves.  However, while the assumption of risk is a key element, it is not the 
only element of insurance.287  Three U.S. Supreme Court precedents in the area of 
insurance law provide helpful guidance for cases beyond the borders of Iowa and 
Kentucky.   
First, the U.S. Supreme Court defined insurance as “an arrangement for 
transferring and distributing risk” in Group Life & Health Company v. Royal Drug 
Company.288  In Group Life, certain pharmacists alleged some pharmacy agreements 
violated the Sherman Act.289  The question was whether these pharmacy agreements 
were the “business of insurance.”290  The Group Life Court stated, “[t]he primary 
elements of an insurance contract are the spreading and underwriting of a 
                                                          
284 Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277. 
285 A Westlaw Classic search performed on Feb. 19, 2013 in ALLCASES using the term 
“HCSM and insurance” brought up no relevant results. 
286 See infra Appendix A.   
287 Jordan v. Group Health Ass’n, 107 F.2d 239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (“[t]he fallacy is in 
looking only at the risk element, to the exclusion of all others present or their subordination to 
it. The question turns, not on whether risk is involved or assumed, but on whether that or 
something else to which it is related in the particular plan is its principal object and 
purpose.”). 
288 Group Life & Health Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979) (quoting 1 G.
RICHARDS, THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 2 (W. Freedman 5th ed., 1952). 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 210.   
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policyholder's risk.”291  The court explained, “[i]t is characteristic of insurance that a 
number of risks are accepted, some of which involve losses, and that such losses are 
spread over all the risks so as to enable the insurer to accept each risk at a slight 
fraction of the possible liability upon it.”292 The Court further explained, “[t]he 
Pharmacy Agreements thus do not involve any underwriting or spreading of risk . . . 
they are not the “business of insurance.”293   
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a more complete definition of “the 
business of insurance” in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts.294  Three 
relevant criteria indicate whether a particular practice falls within “the business of 
insurance:”  
(1) whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a 
policyholder's risk; (2) whether the practice is an integral part of the 
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3) whether 
the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.295
Third, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Variable Annuity Life 
Insurance Company, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether variable annuities 
were “contracts for insurance.”296  Variable annuity benefit payments vary with the 
success of the investment.297  The annuitant “cannot look forward to a fixed monthly 
or yearly amount.”298 Variable annuities share characteristics with fixed annuities, 
including periodic payments continuing until the annuitant’s death or the end of a 
fixed term.299  Issuers “assume the risk of mortality . . .  an actuarial prognostication 
that a certain number of annuitants will survive to specified ages.”300 The annuity 
contract reflects the mortality prediction, which is a risk “assumed both by 
respondents and by those who issue fixed annuities.”301  The “[r]espondents . . . urge 
[this feature] . . . is basically an insurance device.”302  The U.S. Supreme Court 
disagreed: “absent some guarantee of fixed income, the variable annuity places all 
the investment risks on the annuitant, none on the company.”303 The Court 
concluded, “the concept of ‘insurance’ involves some investment risk-taking on the 
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part of the company.” 304 The variable annuity companies guaranteed “nothing to the 
annuitant except an interest in a portfolio of common stocks . . . .”305 Further, 
“[t]here is no true underwriting of risks, the one earmark of insurance . . . .”306
Analyzing these cases with respect to HCSMs reveals several things. First, 
HCSMs as organizations lack the primary element of insurance under Group Life: 
the underwriting of policyholder risk.307 HCSMs lack the “characteristic of 
insurance” that enables “the insurer to accept each risk at a slight fraction of the 
possible liability upon it.”308 The Reinhold dissent correctly pointed out “Medi-Share 
takes no responsibility for the payment of the members' medical bills,” and thus 
bears no liability or risk of loss.309 In other words, HCSMs do not underwrite 
“policyholder risk.”  Further, HCSMs do not “accept each risk at a slight fraction of 
the possible liability upon it.”  Rather, Medi-Share and other HCSMs do not have 
even a fraction of possible liability for member medical bills, which are voluntarily 
shared by other members and not by these HCSMs themselves.   
Second, under Met Life, for courts to consider an HCSM the practice of 
insurance, the HCSM has to have the effect of transferring or spreading a 
policyholder’s risk and the practice must be an “integral part” of the relationship 
between the insurer and insured.310 The Reinhold dissent and the majority effectively 
acknowledged Medi-Share’s cost-sharing contract “has the effect of … spreading a 
policyholder’s risk.”311 Yet, the dissent noted Medi-Share’s assumption of risk did 
not occur “between the insurer and the insured.”312 The majority also stated it was 
the members, not Medi-Share, who “undertake[] to pay or indemnify another as to 
loss from certain . . . ‘risks’.”313  Thus, under the Reinhold majority’s view of these 
facts, Medi-Share’s contractual “spreading of the risk” cannot be said to be an 
“integral part of the . . . policy relationship between the insurer and the insured.”  
Thus, under the Met Life test, HCSMs do not fall within the “business of insurance.”   
Third, under Variable Annuity, HCSMs may have some “aspect[s] of insurance” 
– like variable annuities do.314  Yet, these aspects are apparent, not real; superficial, 
not substantial, because HCSM contracts or member agreements have “no element 
of fixed return” obligatory upon the ministry, much like variable annuities.  HCSMs 
are not involved in “investment risk-taking.”  Much like variable annuities, HCSMs 
essentially “guarantee nothing” to their members except the provision of certain 
services as a clearinghouse for information on medical needs.  Admittedly, CBN’s 
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disavowal of any guarantees is much stronger worded than Medi-Share’s disavowal 
of guarantees.315  Yet, there is no way to remain faithful to the language of these 
HCSM contracts and arrive where the Reinhold majority did.  In short, HCSMs 
feature “no true underwriting of risks, the one earmark of insurance.”316 Much like 
variable annuities, “in hard reality the issuer of a [HCSM commitment contract] that 
has no element of fixed return assumes no true risk in the insurance sense.”317     
2.  Courts Should Apply the “Safe Harbor” HCSM Statutes 
Courts can easily make a detailed list of the need-sharing “processes” HCSMs 
engage in and from there maintain health care cost sharing constitutes the business of 
insurance by focusing on a few aspects of HCSMs.318 Indeed, the Reinhold majority 
                                                          
315 CBN’s member agreement states:  
I am not guaranteed payment for any need of mine that is published in the newsletter. 
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Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v Ins. Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586 N.W. 2d 
352, 353 (Iowa 1998).  Medi-Share’s member commitment contract states:  
[t]his publication does not guarantee or promise that your medical bills will be 
published or assigned to others for payment.  Whether anyone chooses to pay your 
medical bills is strictly voluntary. ... Whether or not you receive any payments for 
medical expenses and whether or not this publication continues to operate, you are 
responsible for payment of your own medical bills.  
Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272, 274 (Ky. 2010).  Analogously, Samaritan 
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I agree that neither I nor Samaritan Ministries have any legal power to force anyone to 
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for any governmental authority to construe giving by members to be a contractual 
obligation. 
Membership Application, SAMARITAN MINISTRIES.ORG http://samaritanministries.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/Member-App-201302.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).   
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Feb. 4, 1993) (on file with author).  The Superior Court quoted the Administrative Hearing 
Officer’s description of the CBN health-care sharing program:  
(1) Through its publications and other activities CBN creates a group or pool of 
subscribers – participants – in its programs. (2) It establishes standards for 
participation by subscribers. (3) It admits applicants to “membership” in the CBN 
program. (4) It determines the amount of each monthly payment (i.e. the Unit 
subscription) to be paid by each member. (5) CBN receives and processes applications 
or requests for payment, that is, for reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by 
participants in the CBN program. (6) CBN determines to what extent each application 
for reimbursement is within its operating criteria and thus can be approved. (7) Upon 
approval, CBN determines the total amount (of reimbursement) to be paid to a 
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pointed out just a few ways Medi-Share held similarities with insurance.319 Instead, 
courts should consider whether the HCSM complies with their own statutory 
definition of HCSMs in a “safe harbor” statute.320 When viewed from this angle, 
Medi-Share complied with Kentucky’s “religious publication” statute in total, with 
only one exception.321 The Reinhold majority held, “[i]t is clear from the statutory 
language of KRS 304.1–120(7) that for Medi-Share to qualify for the Religious 
Publications Exception, it must meet every criterion listed322. . . . Medi-Share does 
not.”323 The majority stated, “[e]ach ‘subscribers' needs’ are . . . not paid directly 
from one subscriber to another, but through Medi-Share. Since Medi-Share does not 
satisfy KRS 304.1–120(7)(d), it does not qualify for the Religious Publication 
Exception.”324
However, the Reinhold majority did not point out any other subsection of K.R.S. 
§ 304.1-120(7) that Medi-Share failed to comply with.  Unlike the Ben Hur Life 
Association’s inattention to its required fraternal duties in Wheeler, Medi-Share gave 
much more than superficial attention to its HCSM duties.325  If the Kentucky 
Reinhold majority had discussed and then applied Kentucky’s entire religious 
                                                          
member. (8) It allocates or assigns a specific amount of money to be paid by named 
members and directs those members to send the specified amount to a named person. 
(9) Upon arrival CBN advises the member seeking reimbursement that certain 
designated members will send moneys to him/her. (10) If the member seeking 
reimbursement does not receive, within three months, a check from a participant in the 
program, in the amount which CBN had directed, the CBN provides a substitute for 
the non-paying member. . . Consequently, given the liberal interpretation to be applied 
to the Insurance Code, it is clear that CBN’s activities fall within those outlined in §§ 
505(a) & (d).   
Id.
319 See, e.g., Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277-78 (“Medi–Share utilizes statistical actuarial 
tables to shift risk the same way a traditional health insurance company sets its premiums . . . . 
[n]either do we doubt that [members of Medi-Share] pay “shares” with the expectation of a 
financial return based on Medi–Share's history of claims payments in the form of the payment 
of their own medical bills . . . . Indeed, the thrust of the advertising is that [Medi-Share] is an 
economical alternative to conventional health insurance programs.”). It should be noted 
however that Medi-Share does not use actuarial tables to calculate member “shares.” Email 
from Stephen Sullivan, Gen. Counsel for Christian Care Ministries, Inc., to Benjamin Boyd 
(Sept. 10, 2012 12:32 MT) (on file with author).   
320 See infra Appendix B.   
321 K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7)(West 2012). Medi-Share’s alleged lack of compliance with 
K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7)(d) is debatable, given the fact the Reinhold majority described Medi-
Share’s member accounts as “individual” accounts that function like escrow accounts, and 
then only later – without any referenced factual basis – described these accounts as a “pool.” 
Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 275, 277 (Ky. 2010). 
322 “This conclusion is inescapable because otherwise the General Assembly would have 
used the disjunctive ‘or’ instead of the conjunctive ‘and.’” Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 279, 
(citing Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 809 (Ky. 1990)).
323 Id.  
324 Id.   
325 Id. at 274-77. 
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publication statute to Medi-Share, the majority should have observed that Medi-
Share does the following things:   
• Medi-Share is a religious publication identified in K.R.S. § 
304.1-120(7) that limits their operations to those activities 
permitted by that statutory subsection.326  
• Medi-Share is a non-profit religious organization,327 limited to 
subscribers who are members of the same denomination or 
religion.328   
• Medi-Share acts as an organizational clearinghouse for 
information between subscribers who have needs and subscribers 
who choose to assist with those needs.329   
• Medi-Share matches subscribers with the present ability to pay 
with subscribers with a present need.330   
• Medi-Share suggests amounts to give that are voluntary among 
the subscribers.331   
• Medi-Share’s need-sharing has no assumption of risk or promise 
to pay either among the subscribers or between the subscribers 
and the publication.332   
• Lastly, Medi-Share provides the statutorily required disclosure 
on their applications, guidelines, publications, and promotional 
materials – which plainly states, “[t]his publication is not issued 
by an insurance company nor is it offered through an insurance 
company.”333   
In short, if the Reinhold majority would consider and apply each part of 
Kentucky’s religious publication statute to Medi-Share, the rationale for the majority 
opinion would change along the following lines:   
• First, the majority would acknowledge that Medi-Share 
functioned as a religious organization and charity, which they 
apparently denied.334   
• Second, the majority would admit that Medi-Share functions as 
an “organizational clearinghouse,” not an insurer, as they 
maintained.335 How can Medi-Share function as “an 
                                                          
326 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-120(7) (West 2012).   
327 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(a).   
328 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(b). 
329 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(c); the Reinhold majority described Medi-Share as 
an “intermediary,” but not as a “clearinghouse.” Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 279.  
330 K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7)(c). 
331 K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7)(e) (emphasis added).   
332 K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7)(e). 
333 K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7)(f).  
334 K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7)(b); Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 279. 
335 See Reinhold, 325 S.W3d at 279. 
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intermediary” for purposes of being excluded from Kentucky’s 
religious publication statute and at the same time somehow 
function as “a type of insurance” for purposes of meeting 
Kentucky’s definition of insurance?   
• Third, the majority would concede that Medi-Share as an 
“organizational clearinghouse for information” should 
“determine which needs are paid, how they are paid, and when 
they are paid.”336  If an HCSM cannot “determine which needs 
are paid, how they are paid, and when they are paid,” how can 
HCSMs ever act as an “informational clearinghouse,” matching 
subscribers who have needs and subscribers who assist with the 
needs?337 In the words of the Reinhold dissent: “this delegation 
and discretion is expressly contemplated by KRS 304.1–
120(7)(c) which recognizes and allows the administration of 
these type of cost-sharing organizations . . .”338
• Fourth, the majority would admit that Medi-Share only suggests
amounts to give that are “voluntary among the subscribers,” thus 
negating Medi-Share’s members’ alleged “obligation” which 
other members allegedly rely on, in spite of the contract 
language.339   
• Fifth, the majority would concede that an assumption of risk or 
promise to pay exists neither among the subscribers or between 
the subscribers and the publication – thus, Medi-Share’s 
members do not assume any risk or promise to pay anything – 
and neither does Medi-Share. The fourth point, if acknowledged, 
removes the key legal cornerstone from the Reinhold majority’s 
holding.340   
• Sixth, the majority would acknowledge that Medi-Share 
complied with Kentucky’s statutorily required disclaimer.  Yet, 
the Reinhold majority discarded “this disclaimer under the guise 
that Medi-Share's function overrides the contract language . . . 
.”341  
                                                          
336 Id.   
337 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(c) (West 2012).   
338 Reinhold, 325 S.W3d at 283; see also Id. at 281 (”this type of management and 
delegation of authority is contemplated in KRS § 304.1–120(7)(c) . . .”) 
339 Id. at 278. 
340 Id. 
341 Id. at 280 n.1 (“[t]he General Assembly of Kentucky promulgated and requires this 
disclaimer when religious institutions attempt to create these cost-sharing organizations . . . . I 
also recognize that the General Assembly, in passing this statute, considers the disclaimer 
more pertinent than a normal one used by a non-religious institution. Otherwise, subsection (f) 
becomes superfluous, and will be read as an irrelevant section of Kentucky law.”) 
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In conclusion, the Reinhold majority ignored Medi-Share’s substance as a HCSM 
and emphasized Medi-Share’s minimal and superficial similarities to insurance.342  
The majority simply failed to give due consideration to Medi-Share’s substantial 
compliance with Kentucky statute as a religious publication statutorily exempt from 
Kentucky’s insurance regulations. Going forward, courts should give due 
consideration to whether the HCSM complies with its own statutory definition of 
HCSMs in these “safe harbor” statutes, rather than cataloguing the ways the health 
care sharing process may bear superficial similarities to insurance.   
3.  Should Courts Review other Analogous Case Law?  
While case law regarding other organizations and practices can be instructive to a 
degree, courts and insurance regulators should exercise caution when analogizing 
HCSMs to other practices or agencies that courts have held to be insurance.  Not 
only is this type of legal reasoning sloppy logic,343 it is also relatively futile. The 
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia declined to embark upon a 
similar inquiry: “[n]o good purpose would be served by an extensive review of cases 
dealing with multitudinous types of organization and function [sic] holding them to 
be or not to be engaged in some form of insurance business.”344 The Court reasoned, 
“[o]nly a very few deal with the specific issue presented here, namely, whether 
consumer cooperatives are so engaged” in the business of insurance.345   
Likewise, should future litigation arise over HCSMs, courts and insurance 
regulators should confine themselves to the specific issues presented – the issues of 
whether the HCSM in question complies with the applicable “safe harbor” statutory 
exemption for HCSMs and whether HCSMs are indeed engaged in the business of 
insurance.  This Article now turns to consider five additional reasons why the states 
should not regulate HCSMs as insurance.   
VII.  Some Final Considerations for Courts and State Insurance Regulators
A.  The Freedom to Contract / Public Policy
First, HCSM agreements must receive legal protection under the freedom to 
contract.346 Kentucky’s Supreme Court recognized the freedom to contract is 
“safeguarded by the constitutional guaranty of ‘pursuit of happiness,’ so one has the 
right to refuse to accept a contract or to assume such liability as may be 
                                                          
342 See also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 
68 (1959) (where the variable annuities at issue had “an aspect of insurance. Yet it is apparent, 
not real; superficial, not substantial. In hard reality the issuer of a variable annuity that has no 
element of a fixed return assumes no true risk in the insurance sense.”) 
343 See supra Part 4.A.2. 
344 Jordan v. Group. Health Ass’n, 107 F.2d 239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (citing the 
annotations in 63 A.L.R. 711 and 100 A.L.R. 1449, when faced with the question whether a 
certain consumer cooperative was insurance).  
345 Id.   
346 See, e.g., Mullins v. Northern Ky. Inspections, Inc., No. 2009-CA-000067-MR, 2010 
WL 3447630 at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2010) (citation omitted) (“the doctrine of freedom to 
contract prevails and, in the absence of ambiguity, a written instrument will be enforced 
strictly according to its terms.”) 
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proposed.”347  The Reinhold majority overlooked the fact that competent adults 
freely agreed to the Medi-Share agreement, which requires members to affirm they 
have “volunteered, in faith, to share in meeting needs through the biblical concept of 
Christian mutual sharing.”348 The acknowledgement continues: “I further understand 
that all money comes from the voluntary giving of Members, not from the Christian 
Care Ministry, and that the Christian Care Ministry is not liable for the payment of 
any medical bills.”349   
Simply, competent adults freely sign these “commitment contracts” and 
“membership applications,” agreeing the HCSM is “not insurance” and agreeing to 
meet the needs of others of faith voluntarily through the sharing ministry.  If people 
of faith seek their own “pursuit of happiness” and assume the obligations incumbent 
upon HCSM members, they have “the right to refuse to accept a contract or to 
assume such liability as may be proposed.”350 Strangely enough, HCSM members do 
not want the supposed benefit of insurance regulations encumbering their particular 
sharing ministry: “the consumers apparently needing the Department’s protection 
seek an exemption from those regulations.”351 The HCSM members insurance 
regulators seek to protect freely signed contracts that do not implicate the restrictions 
of state insurance regulations.  In such situations, both the courts and insurance 
regulators should not deny people of faith the right to contract as they wish and 
voluntarily share medical expenses.   
Second, there are no public policy reasons to restrict HCSM member contracts 
and force HCSMs into the mold of insurance companies.  Kentucky’s Supreme 
Court defined “public policy” as: “the principles under which freedom of contract 
and private dealing are restricted by law for the good of the community.”352  Further, 
“[c]ertain classes of contracts, though not prohibited by the Constitution or statutes, 
are held by the courts to be against public policy on the ground that they promote 
unfairness and injustice, and are therefore mischievous in their tendency, and 
detrimental to the public good.”353  Do HCSMs promote unfairness or injustice?  Are 
HCSMs detrimental to the public good? Interestingly, Iowa’s Supreme Court in 
Barberton noted as an aside that “[t]he evidence is uncontradicted that no member 
complaints have been filed with the insurance division by any newsletter 
members.”354  Further, in Reinhold, the Kentucky Attorney General’s office had 
                                                          
347 General Elec. Co. v. Am. Buyers Co-op., Inc., 316 S.W.2d 354, 354 (Ky. 1958) 
(citations omitted) (Kentucky’s Supreme Court acknowledged that “[w]hile the term ‘freedom 
of contract’ does not appear in the federal or state constitutions, it is always embraced in the 
meaning of ‘liberty’ as employed in those instruments . . . .”) 
348 Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272 at 274 (Ky. 2010). 
349 Id.   
350 General Elec. Co., 316 S.W.2d at 361.   
351 In re Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc. No. 1-1004-14523-2, State of Minn. Office of 
Admin. Hearings for the Comm’r of Commerce, June 18, 2003.   
352 Central W. Cas. Co. v. Stewart, 58 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Ky. Ct. App. 1933) (internal 
citations omitted). 
353 Id.  
354 Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Insurance Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586 
N.W.2d 352, 357 (Iowa 1998). 
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investigated no complaints against Medi-Share when the case was at the trial court 
level.355   
Where there is no evidence of unfairness, injustice, mischievous tendencies, or 
detriment to the public good, as with the Reinhold and Barberton cases, then, as a 
matter of public policy, HCSM members’ freedom to contract should not be 
restricted “for the good of the community.”  Instead, as a matter of policy, HCSM 
members must have the same freedom to contract as any other member of society.  
Where government has a duty to uphold the public policy of protecting consumers 
from potential scams or unscrupulous practices, the solution should not involve 
equating HCSMs with insurance, as these ministries are not insurance.  Applying 
statutory regulations “designed to fit” insurance to the operations of cooperative 
HCSM organizations “could not be other than incongruous, or fatal” to the 
HCSMs.356 “It would result, not in regulation, but in destruction of the 
organization.”357 Rather than destroying the voluntary, cooperative nature of HCSMs 
by forcing HCSMs into insurance regulations, state legislatures may achieve the 
general public policy goal of protecting consumers by requiring HCSMs to employ 
statutory disclaimers in their advertising materials.358 State legislatures may also 
further this public policy goal by enacting specific statutory “safe harbor” 
exemptions from insurance regulations for HCSMs, as twenty-one states have done 
to date.359     
B.  The Freedom of Religion 
HCSMs and their members should receive protection from insurance regulations 
under the constitutional freedom of religion.  The three major HCSMs possess a 
distinctly religious focus and explain this in different ways.   
Reverend Howard Russell, president of the Christian Healthcare Ministry, 
formerly CBN, stated the first health insurance policies surfaced around the 
1920’s.360 In contrast to health insurance, Russell noted that Christians have been 
sharing one another’s medical burdens for hundreds and hundreds of years.361 The 
                                                          
355 Roger Alford, Kentucky Churchgoers: Medi-Share Not an Insurance Program, 
INSURANCE JOURNAL, Oct. 30, 2006, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast 
/2006/10/30/73618.htm (last visited June 22, 2012) (Vicki Glass, spokeswoman for the 
Kentucky Attorney General’s Office, said her office has investigated no complaints). 
356 Jordan v. Group Health Ass’n, 107 F.2d 239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (regarding a certain 
consumer cooperative which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found not to be insurance).   
357 Id.   
358 In re Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc. No. 1-1004-14523-2, State of Minn. Office of 
Admin. Hearings for the Comm’r of Commerce, June 18, 2003 (Administrative Law Judge 
Beck opined: “it appears that the explicit disclaimers used by CBN have avoided complaints 
in the past, and presumably should do so in the future. The Department has not shown how a 
warning would not suffice to meet its interest in protecting consumers and the public safety.”).    
359 See infra Appendix B; see also The Alliance of Health Care Sharing Ministries, What is 
a Health Care Sharing Ministry?, http://www.healthcaresharing.org/hcsm (last visited July 14, 
2012).   
360 Telephone Interview with Rev. Howard Russell, President, Christian Healthcare 
Ministries (July 25, 2012).   
361 Id.   
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Christian Healthcare Ministry also asserts, “[t]he New Testament says Christians 
should carry each other’s burdens. That is the foundation of our voluntary cost-
sharing ministry.”362 Likewise, Medi-Share maintains it promotes religious and 
biblical values because “[t]aking care of each other was a way of life for Christians 
in the [early] days of the Church.”363 Medi-Share members seek to fulfill the Biblical 
requirement, “[a]nd do not forget to do good and to share with others, for with such 
sacrifices God is pleased.”364  Medi-Share explains this requirement so:  
Christians continued to care for each other well into the twentieth century. 
But after World War II, government programs and insurance companies 
assumed the Church’s role as caretaker. When medical costs soared, many 
churches found they lacked the resources to care for their members. 
Christians view not-for-profit ministries like Medi-Share as a way to 
reclaim their biblical mandate to care and provide for their brothers and 
sisters in Christ.365
Samaritan Ministries International founded its HCSM on the principle that “God 
is the ultimate Source of provision for every need encountered by the Christian.  
Even when help comes through a person, it ultimately comes from God.”366  
Samaritan Ministries embraces the principle that “[a] medical need cannot be met 
with money alone. Prayer and encouragement are also needed.”367 Samaritan 
Ministries believes “[i]t is the responsibility of those within the Body of Christ to 
allow themselves to be used of God to help in meeting the needs of other 
Christians.”368   
While no reported cases on HCSMs deal with the freedom of religion,369 in 2003, 
Minnesota Administrative Law Judge Greg Beck considered this argument as 
                                                          
362 Christian Healthcare Ministries, How it Works, CHRISTIAN HEALTHCARE MINISTRY, 
http://www.chministries.org/howitworks.aspx (last visited on July 12, 2012) (referring to 
Galatians 6:2). 
363 Medi-Share, FAQs, MYCHRISTIANCARE.ORG, http://mychristiancare.org/Medi-
Share/Public_Content/Medi-Share_FAQs.aspx#1q2 (last visited July 12, 2012).   
364 Id. (quoting Hebrews 13:16). 
365 Id.   
366 Samaritan Ministries International, Foundational Principles, SAMARITAN MINISTRIES, 
http://www.samaritanministries.org/principles/ (last visited July 12, 2012).   
367 Id.   
368 Id.   
369 But see Christian Bhd. Newsletter v. Levinson, C.A. No. 92A-06-016 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 4, 1993) (on file with author).  Delaware’s Supreme Court implicitly addressed the 
freedom of religion when that court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision in Christian Bhd. 
Newsletter v. Levinson. See Christian Bhd. Newsletter v. Levinson, No. 103,1993 (Del. Aug. 
3, 1993) (unpublished order), available at http://de.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer 
.aspx/xq/fac.19930803_0004.DE.htm/qx. After finding CBN lacked standing to assert the 
religious First Amendment rights of its subscribers, the Superior Court in dicta addressed the 
applicability of the rule from Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-879 (1990).  
Christian Bhd. Newsletter v. Levinson, C.A. No. 92A-06-016 at 10-11.  “The right of free 
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law 
of general applicability on the ground that law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that is 
2013] HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES 265 
applied to an HCSM.370  In 2001, Minnesota’s Commissioner of Commerce had 
issued a Cease and Desist Order against the Christian Brotherhood Newsletter 
[CBN], alleging “the newsletter was engaging in the business of insurance in 
Minnesota without a license….”371 Two CBN subscribers, John and Lynne Cooke, 
petitioned to intervene in the matter.372 The ALJ denied the Cooke’s petition, yet 
allowed them to file a memorandum in support of CBN’s Motion for Summary 
Disposition.373  Ultimately, Judge Beck’s recommendation both rescinded the Cease 
and Desist Order and granted CBN’s Motion for Summary Disposition.374   
It is important to note how Judge Beck dealt with this important legal issue for 
HCSMs as an example of how courts should respect HCSM members’ freedom of 
religion. In this administrative matter, both CBN and the Cookes argued that the 
Minnesota Department of Commerce’s attempt to regulate CBN as an insurance 
company violated both the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
the freedom of conscience clause in the Minnesota Constitution.375  Judge Beck did 
not apply the rule from the Employment Division v. Smith case.376  Instead, Judge 
Beck applied a “compelling state interest balancing test” and considered “whether 
the objector’s belief is sincerely held, whether the state regulation burdens the 
exercise of religious beliefs, whether the state interest in the regulation is overriding 
or compelling, and whether the state regulation uses the least restrictive means.”377   
The first factor was not in dispute.378  On the second factor, Judge Beck 
concluded that CBN and “the Cookes have demonstrated that regulation would 
                                                          
religion prescribes (or proscribes).”  Id. The Superior Court, applying Smith, held “the 
regulation of CBN’s newsletter activities does not offend the U.S. or the Delaware 
Constitution in this regard.  The Insurance Code does not seek to prescribe or proscribe 
religious beliefs of activities.  It is valid and neutral in substance and in application.”  Id. at 
11-12. 
370 In re Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc., No. 1-1004-14523-2, State of Minn. Office of 
Admin. Hearings for the Comm’r of Commerce, June 18, 2003.   
371 Id.   
372 Id.  
373 Id.  
374 Id. (an administrative equivalent to a motion for summary judgment).   
375 Id.   
376 Id. See text at n. 78-80 (citing Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-879 
(1990)). Administrative Law Judge Beck reasoned, “[t]he Cookes and the Respondents also 
assert that they fall within an exception recognized in Smith for “hybrid” cases where more 
than one constitutional right is involved.  Even after Smith, a hybrid rights case will receive 
strict scrutiny under the free exercise clause.  …  Since the solicitation of contributions is 
protected free speech, it appears that this case involves more than one constitutional right and 
would not be decided under the analysis applied in Smith.  The hybrid analysis is similar to the 
analysis employed under the Minnesota Constitution.” Id.
377 In re Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc., No. 1-1004-14523-2, State of Minn. Office of 
Admin. Hearings for the Comm’r of Commerce, June 18, 2003. 
378 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 85.   
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burden the exercise of their beliefs.”379 The record demonstrated CBN’s health care 
sharing ministry “is a vehicle for the expression of Christian faith by those who 
subscribe.”380 Judge Beck noted, “[s]ome subscribers, such as the Cookes, contribute 
monthly but make no medical expense claims. They do not use the newsletter as 
insurance, but as a means of giving to others in need.”381 Other CBN subscribers 
submitted affidavits stating that, “subscription to the newsletter is a voluntary 
expression of Christian faith that allows subscribers to practice their sincere belief 
that the Bible requires them to share one another’s burdens. They describe 
participation in the newsletter as an act of worship.”382 Mr. Cooke stated “the 
newsletter allows him to fulfill his obligation to God to contribute to the medical 
needs of other Christians.”383 Judge Beck observed, “[t]he fact that subscribers are 
willing to make monthly payments to CBN with a clear understanding that they are 
promised nothing in return, indicates that there is a strong non-economic factor 
involved.”384  Judge Beck also opined, “the free exercise of religion includes the 
right to select the form of worship, at least where the state interest in regulation is 
not strongly compelling.”385   
On the third and fourth factors, the Department of Commerce did not establish 
that regulating CBN as an insurance company was an overriding or compelling state 
interest, nor did it demonstrate that “regulation as an insurance company is the least 
restrictive alternative.”386 The Cookes argued the Department had shown no 
compelling or overriding interest in light of the fact that the consumers apparently 
needing the Department’s protection sought an exemption from those regulations.387  
The affidavits of subscribers indicated they believed regulation unnecessary.388  The 
Cookes argued the Department could achieve its interest through less restrictive 
means, namely requiring CBN to use explicit warnings and disclaimers in its 
correspondence.389 Judge Beck observed, “it appears that the explicit disclaimers 
used by CBN have avoided complaints in the past, and presumably should do so in 
the future.”390  In balancing these factors, Judge Beck concluded, “the infringement 
on the sincere religious beliefs of CBN and its subscribers outweighs the 
Department’s interest in regulation.”391   
                                                          
379 In re Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc., No. 1-1004-14523-2, State of Minn. Office of 
Admin. Hearings for the Comm’r of Commerce, June 18, 2003.   
380 Id.   
381 Id.   
382 Id.  
383 Id. 
384 Id.  
385 Id. 
386 Id.   
387 Id.   
388 Id.  
389 Id.  
390 Id.   
391 Id.   
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In conclusion, HCSMs are much more than a “purportedly biblically based 
ministerial service”392 or an unregulated insurance substitute “operating under the 
guise of religion.”393  Though HCSMs involve charity, HCSMs are more than a 
charitable endeavor and they involve more than just simple altruism.394  HCSMs are 
religious ministries, and members of HCSMs have the constitutional right to the free 
exercise of their religious faith. This right goes far beyond mere charity or simple 
altruism. This fundamental freedom requires that the courts and state insurance 
regulators respect this individual right to share the medical financial burdens of 
others according to one’s own conscience and religious convictions.  
C.  The Separation of Powers
A third reason why state courts should not view HCSMs as insurance lies in the 
doctrine of the separation of powers.  Simply, if state legislatures intended to include 
HCSMs within the definition of insurance, the legislatures could do so without the 
help of the judicial branch extending insurance laws to envelop HCSMs. The 
California Supreme Court believed “a sound jurisprudence does not suggest the 
extension, by judicial construction, of the insurance laws to govern every contract 
involving an assumption of risk or indemnification of loss ….”395  In a case 
involving a railroad’s voluntary relief fund, the New York Court of Appeals stated, 
“[t]he defendant's relief department has been in existence more than 25 years, and if 
the Legislature had intended to include such a department within the provisions of 
section 201 of the Insurance Law, it would have used language therein to show such 
intention.”396 Likewise, in regard to HCSMs, it is a temptation for courts to extend 
insurance laws and envelop HCSMs at the behest of administrative officers. A sound 
jurisprudence, however, does require or even suggest this extension.  If the various 
state legislatures intended to include HCSMs within the definition of insurance, 
those legislatures would have used language to show that intention.  This they have 
not done.   
The Kansas Supreme Court stated, regarding whether a certain cemetery 
corporation was in the insurance business: “[i]f the legislature had considered pre-
need contracts to furnish such property as being within the realm of state insurance 
regulation there would have been little occasion for the enactment of K.S.A. 16-
301.”397  Further, “this may be considered some indication of legislative intent as to 
what is embraced within the insurance code. The entire subject is within legislative 
                                                          
392 Commonwealth v. Reinhold, No. 2007-CA-000661-MR, 2008 WL 4530900 (Ky. Ct. 
App. Oct. 10, 2008) (Nickell, J., concurring in result only), rev’d, 325 S.W.3d 272 (Ky. 2010).   
393 Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting).   
394 Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272, 278 (Ky. 2010) (“[W]e do not doubt the 
claim that Medi–Share members are altruistically inspired . . . .”  The majority also believed 
the facts before them did not support the contention that Medi-Share members were “actually 
undertaking a charitable endeavor and not attempting to shift the risk.”).   
395 Transportation Guarantee Co. v. Jellins, 174 P.2d 625, 629 (Ca. 1946) ( “[T]hat when 
the question arises each contract must be tested by its own terms as they are written, as they 
are understood by the parties, and as they are applied under the particular circumstances 
involved.”) 
396 Colaizzi v.  Pa. R.R. Co., 101 N.E. 859, 863 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1913).   
397 Londerholm v. Anderson, 408 P.2d 864, 876 (Kan. 1966).   
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compass and further supervision should be left to legislative direction.”398  
Regarding a consumer cooperative, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia stated:  
[E]xperience to date with consumer cooperatives, organized and limited 
in their activities, management and membership as in Group Health, has 
not shown that they are susceptible to the abuses feared. If they or others 
should appear, measures for their control should be enacted by [sic] the 
legislature, not prescribed through judicial expansion of existing statutes 
designed for other organizations' activities and abuses.399
Similarly, if state legislatures considered HCSM “commitment contracts” to fall 
in the realm of insurance, there would be little need for those state legislatures to 
enact “safe harbor” statutes that define HCSMs. This fact should be considered at 
least some indication of legislative intent. The subject of whether HCSMs are 
“insurance” is within the legislative compass and further supervision should be left 
to the state legislatures, not the judiciary or administrative officers. Likewise, 
experience to date with HCSMs, organized and limited in their activities, 
management, and membership, has not shown that they are susceptible to the abuses 
certain state insurance commissioners fear.400 If such abuses should appear, state 
legislatures may enact other HCSM-specific measures to regulate such abuses. The 
judiciary should not expand existing insurance statutes that are “designed for other 
organizations’ activities and abuses.”401  
D.  Implications of HCSMs’ Status as Charitable Organizations 
HCSMs are 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charitable and religious organizations, and as 
non-profit religious organizations HCSMs are under the regulatory oversight of the 
state attorneys general.402 “In the common law,403 under the provisions of the 
                                                          
398 Id.  
399 Jordan v. Group Health Ass’n, 107 F.2d 239, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1939).   
400 See, e.g., supra Part 4.C.1.   
401 Jordan, 107 F.2d at 253. 
402 Mary Blasko, Curt Crossley & David Lloyd, Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 
28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 40-41 (1993). 
403 Id. (“The various American states almost unanimously adopted this principle, reasoning 
that ‘the state, as parens patriae, superintends the management of all public charities or trusts, 
and in these matters acts through her attorney general.’”).  Blasko was quoting the California 
Supreme Court, which opined at length:  
[t]he state, as parens patriae, superintends the management of all public charities or 
trusts, and in these matters acts through her attorney general. Generally speaking, such 
an action will not be entertained at all unless the attorney general is a party to it. Such 
was the rule at common law, and it has not been changed in this state. Even in those 
states, such as Massachusetts, where by special statute the attorney general is 
instructed to prosecute such actions, it is declared that the statute does not narrow or 
diminish in this regard the common law powers incident to the office. 
Ellert v. Cogswell, 45 P. 270, 271 (Cal. 1896) (citation omitted).   
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Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act,404 and in the statutes of all 
jurisdictions,405 the Attorney General has standing to supervise charities and enforce 
their legal responsibilities.”406  “The attorneys general represent the public interest in 
court in enforcing the fiduciary obligations charitable organizations undertake to the 
public.”407  However, if judges or state insurance departments forget the authority of 
the state attorneys general, they might assume that HCSMs would remain completely 
unregulated if not subject to state insurance regulations.  This assumption presents a 
false dilemma, also known as the ‘logical fallacy of bifurcation,’ where “someone is 
asked to choose between two options when there is at least one other option 
available.”408 Thus, Judge Nickell of the Kentucky Court of Appeals wrote of 
“Medi-Share’s unabashed attempt to avoid regulatory oversight and review 
demanded of health insurers . . .”409   
HCSMs are not attempting to avoid oversight.  In fact, HCSMs cannot avoid the 
supervisorial and enforcement oversight of the respective state attorneys general.  
The specific structure of HCSMs and the “safe harbor” statutes keep HCSMs from 
the specific regulatory oversight the states demand of health insurers.  Thus, this 
false dilemma bifurcates between the choices of either 1) regulatory oversight by 
state insurance departments; or 2) absolutely no oversight at all.  Interestingly, the 
available option of attorneys general enforcement evidently did not surface on 
Kentucky’s radar in the Reinhold lawsuit.  This is not surprising, for the Kentucky 
Attorney General’s Office had investigated no complaints at all regarding Medi-
Share410 and would thus have no standing to bring a lawsuit against the Christian 
Care Ministry and its Medi-Share program.   
Attorney general supervision of HCSMs does work and destroys the “either/or” 
of the false dilemma.  The Ohio Attorney General filed suit against the Christian 
Brotherhood Newsletter in 2001 and this suit is an example of a state’s attorney 
general’s oversight over an HCSM.411  This Ohio lawsuit charged the founder of 
CBN with fraud and conversion, and demanded the return of property and cash 
                                                          
404  Rev. Model Nonprofit Corp. Act §1.70 (1987).   
405 See Blasko, et al., supra note 402, at 45–47 (surveying state statutes that outline the 
authority of the state attorney generals). 
406 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 10:19 (West 2012).   
407 Id.   
408 See, e.g., False Dilemma, LOGICAL FALLACIES.ORG, http://www.logicalfallacies.info/ 
presumption/false-dilemma/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).   
409 Commonwealth v. Reinhold, No. 2007-CA-000661-MR, 2008 WL 4530900 (Ky. Ct. 
App. Oct. 10, 2008) (Nickell, J., concurring in result only), rev’d, 325 S.W.3d 272 (Ky. 2010).
410 Roger Alford, Kentucky Churchgoers: Medi-Share Not an Insurance Program, 
INSURANCE JOURNAL, October 30, 2006, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast 
/2006/10/30/73618.htm (last visited June 22, 2012) (Vicki Glass, spokeswoman for the 
Kentucky Attorney General’s Office, said her office has investigated no complaints.). 
411 Chuck Fager, Lawsuit: Health Plan Accused, CHRISTIANITY TODAY ONLINE (April 2, 
2001), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2001/april2/8.23.html (last visited July 13, 2012).  
(“The Christian Brotherhood Newsletter had to repay nearly $15 million that previous 
management spent on homes, motorcycles and luxury cars.  The company was placed in 
receivership in 2001, and the management was removed.”).   
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worth over $2.4 million dollars.412 After the lawsuit, CBN continued to operate 
under new leadership with established safeguards to prevent such problems.413 Thus, 
through the common law and state statute, state attorneys general have a check on 
HCSMs.  The state attorneys general have the legal ability to intervene if HCSMs are 
abusing their authority and not using assets for their proper charitable purposes.   
In conclusion, the status of HCSMs as nonprofit religious organizations brings 
HCSMs under the supervisorial and enforcement authority of the state attorneys 
general.  State courts and insurance regulators should not assume that HCSMs need 
additional regulatory oversight and review by subjecting these ministries to state 
insurance regulations.   
E.  Federal Preemption Under PPACA 
Finally, state legislators, regulators and courts should be aware that the 
congressional action granting HCSM members a religious exemption from PPACA’s 
individual mandate likely preempts the state regulation of HCSMs as insurance.414  
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides, “[t]he business of insurance, and every 
person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate 
to the regulation or taxation of such business.”415 McCarran-Ferguson then limits 
state regulation of insurance so: “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to 
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such 
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . .”416  
The U.S. Supreme Court has employed a three-part test to determine whether the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts state law from preemption by a federal statute.417  
The test is: “(1) whether the federal statute specifically relates to the business of 
insurance; (2) whether the state law at issue was enacted for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance; and (3) whether the application of the federal 
law invalidates, supersedes or impairs the state law.”418   
First, PPACA specifically relates to the business of insurance. From there, at 
least four scenarios are possible when applying McCarran-Ferguson’s test to 
PPACA’s HCSM exemption. The first scenario occurred in Kentucky, where 
Kentucky’s Supreme Court defined Medi-Share as “insurance” under Kentucky’s 
insurance code.419 Thus, Kentucky meets the second element of the McCarran-
                                                          
412 Id.; Sarah Skidmore, Sharing the Burden: Regulation-free Religious Groups Offer Cost-
Sharing Alternatives to Traditional Health Insurance by Banning Risky, High-Cost Behavior, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, January 8, 2006, http://www.utsandiego.com/uniontrib/2006 
0108/news_lz1b8burden.html (last visited July 13, 2012).  
413 Id. 
414 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)(2)(B) (West 2012) (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act).  The author is indebted to Mr. Keith Hopkinson for his assistance on this section.   
415 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012 (a) (West 2012).   
416 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012 (b).   
417 United States Dep’t. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993).   
418 Nat’l Home Ins. Co. v. King, 291 F. Supp. 2d 518, 528 (E.D. Ky. 2003), (citing United 
States Dep’t. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993)).   
419 Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272, 277-278 (Ky. 2010). 
2013] HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES 271 
Ferguson test, where state laws that define “insurance” regulate the business of 
insurance.  The key question in this scenario is whether the application of PPACA’s 
“religious exemption” for HCSMs invalidates, supersedes or impairs the state law, 
the third element. PPACA’s religious exemption for HCSM members features a 
broad, inclusive definition of HCSMs.  The text of PPACA defines the term “health 
care sharing ministry” as an organization:  
(I) which is described in section 501(c)(3) and is exempt from taxation 
under section 501(a),  
(II) members of which share a common set of ethical or religious beliefs 
and share medical expenses among members in accordance with those 
beliefs and without regard to the State in which a member resides or is 
employed,  
(III) members of which retain membership even after they develop a 
medical condition,  
(IV) which (or a predecessor of which) has been in existence at all times 
since December 31, 1999, and medical expenses of its members have 
been shared continuously and without interruption since at least 
December 31, 1999, and  
(V) which conducts an annual audit which is performed by an 
independent certified public accounting firm in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles and which is made available to the public 
upon request.420
The application of the HCSM “religious exemption” from PPACA’s individual 
mandate will impair Kentucky’s state law.  Under Kentucky’s statutory definition of 
insurance, the Reinhold court found Medi-Share was insurance. However, under 
PPACA’s religious exemption, Medi-Share would meet all the broad elements 
above, and would not be insurance, thus impairing Kentucky’s definition of 
insurance.  In this scenario, PPACA would preempt Kentucky’s statute, as applied in 
Reinhold, and allow Medi-Share to operate in Kentucky.   
The second scenario could play out through the HCSM “safe harbor” laws.  
Under the second element of the McCarran-Ferguson test, many of these state 
statutes arguably were enacted “for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance.”421 That is, these “safe harbor” laws define HCSMs and shelter these 
ministries from the provisions of state insurance codes, thus “regulating the business 
of insurance.” Perhaps more appropriately, these statutes regulate what is and what is 
not the business of insurance. Given this assumption, a problem arises.  Many of the 
state HCSM “safe harbor” laws are much more specific than PPACA’s definition of 
an HCSM.422 For example, Kentucky’s “Religious Publication” statute that 
specifically requires HCSMs to pay “for the subscribers' financial or medical needs 
by payments directly from one (1) subscriber to another.”423 PPACA’s “religious 
exemption” merely requires each HCSM to “share medical expenses among 
                                                          
420 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I-V) (West 2012).   
421 King, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 528.   
422 See, e.g., infra Appendix B; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6300; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6301. 
423 KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1–120(7)(d) (West 2012).   
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members in accordance with those beliefs”424 without regard to whether the sharing 
of expenses occurs directly from member to member, or indirectly, through escrow-
type accounts. In sum, the application of PPACA’s “religious exemption” would 
invalidate, supersede or impair the state law in Kentucky’s “Religious Publication” 
exemption used to define HCSMs.425 With this scenario, PPACA’s religious 
exemption would preempt all narrower state law definitions of HCSMs and allow 
HCSMs to operate in such states.   
The third scenario might play out as follows.  Under the second element of the 
McCarran-Ferguson test, the state “safe harbor” laws that define HCSMs and shelter 
these ministries from insurance regulations do not operate to regulate the business of 
insurance.426  Rather, these state “safe harbor” laws operate to regulate and define 
HCSMs, which are not insurance. Thus, as state “safe harbor” laws do not regulate 
the business of insurance, the principles of the McCarran-Ferguson Act would 
exempt such state “safe harbor” laws from preemption by PPACA’s “religious 
exemption” for HCSMs.   
The final scenario could operate as such.  Congress has spoken on the issue of 
HCSMs through PPACA, and PPACA’s “religious exemption” has decreed in 
essence that HCSM membership is an acceptable alternative to PPACA’s 
requirement to “maintain minimum essential [insurance] coverage.”427 The 
application of PPACA’s religious exemption for HCSM membership would impair 
narrower state laws enacted to regulate the business of insurance by defining what 
HCSMs are.428  This fourth scenario would thus meet the three elements of the 
McCarran Ferguson test.   
With the fourth scenario, the Liability Risk Retention Act (LRRA) and its well-
known preemption of state-level insurance regulation are persuasive on what 
regulatory authority the states would possess over HCSMs in the wake of PPACA.429  
The LRRA exempts risk retention groups from “any State law, rule, regulation, or 
order to the extent that such . . . would . . . make unlawful, or regulate, directly or 
indirectly, the operation of a risk retention group.”430 Analogously, PPACA would 
exempt HCSMs from any state law, rule, regulation or order to the extent the state’s 
action would make the operation of HCSMs unlawful. Under LRRA’s persuasive 
precedent, the states under PPACA could at the most require similar registration, 
financial examination, and reporting requirements that the LRRA requires of risk 
retention groups.431   
In conclusion, there are many, many unknowns regarding PPACA’s effect on 
HCSMs and HCSM members via the federal regulations that will implement 
                                                          
424 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (West 2012). 
425 Nat’l Home Ins. Co. v. King, 291 F. Supp. 2d 518, 528 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
426 Id.  
427 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a) (West 2012).   
428 King, 291 F. Supp. at 528 (citing United States Dep’t. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 
(1993)).   
429 15 U.S.C. § 3902(a) (West 2012).   
430 Id. at (a)(1).  
431 Id. at (a)(1)(A)-(I).   
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PPACA.  Whatever the future holds for HCSMs under PPACA’s regulatory regime, 
PPACA most likely will preempt the state regulation of HCSMs under the legal 
standards of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the LRRA’s analogous legal 
principles.   
VIII.  Conclusion: The Reinhold Epilogue 
After the remand of the Reinhold case, the Kentucky Department of Insurance 
moved the Franklin County Circuit Court for a permanent injunction barring Medi-
Share from operating in Kentucky outside the scope of a specific exemption.432  In 
March 2011, Medi-Share agreed to an order for a permanent injunction prohibiting 
their operations in Kentucky.433 Despite Medi-Share’s objections, the order 
stipulated Medi-Share is insurance and not exempt from the insurance code, and 
barred Medi-Share from transacting insurance in Kentucky, unless it obtained a 
certificate of authority or license, or qualified for an exemption.434   
Medi-Share sought to qualify for the exemption. Medi-Share’s representatives 
met with the Department to discuss potential changes to the program.435 Medi-Share 
hoped the changes would bring the HCSM within the scope of the exemption.436 The 
Department issued a letter in April 2011 reiterating that Medi-Share did not qualify 
for the exemption because Medi-Share did not feature direct payments between 
subscribers, a promise to pay exists between the subscribers and Medi-Share, and the 
monthly amounts due are specified by Medi-Share.437 Medi-Share requested an 
administrative hearing to determine whether Medi-Share qualified for the exemption; 
the Department denied Medi-Share’s request and simultaneously filed a Motion for 
Contempt.438 The Department asserted Medi-Share continued to operate in violation 
of the permanent injunction.439   
Medi-Share responded by maintaining it modified its plan, thus complying with 
K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7) and the Supreme Court’s ruling.440 The Franklin Circuit Court 
held a hearing in August 2012.441 First, the Circuit Court did not find Medi-Share in 
contempt.442 The court was unwilling to find Med-Share operated in violation of the 
injunction willfully, knowingly or disrespectfully, as Medi-Share in good faith 
                                                          
432 Commonwealth v. Reinhold, C.A. Nos. 02-CI-00837 and 11-CI-1292, at 2 (Ky. Cir. Ct.  
Oct. 2, 2012) (unpublished opinion and order) (on file with author).   
433 Id. at 1-2 (citing the “Agreed Order and Judgment of Permanent Injunction Prohibiting 
Operation of MediShare in the Commonwealth of Kentucky” that parties entered into).     
434 Id. at 3. 
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believed it complied with the exemption.443 Second, the court held that Medi-Share, 
“even after modifications, remains noncompliant with the provisions of the 
exemption as explicated by the Supreme Court in Reinhold.”444   
The Circuit Court found that Medi-Share “still serves as an intermediary through 
which monthly shares from subscribers are collected and held, pending use for 
paying other subscribers’ medical needs.”445 Medi-Share provided testimony of 
changes to its operations.446 Medi-Share’s members no longer submit payments to a 
trust account.447 Rather, Medi-Share’s members transfer funds directly from their 
own account to another member’s account.448 Members set up a designated credit 
union account, deposit money on a monthly basis, and grant Medi-Share a limited 
power of attorney to transfer money to cover costs and benefit other members.449  
The Circuit Court concluded Medi-Share “still fails to comply with the Supreme 
Court’s decision because ‘Medi-Share [still] determines which needs are paid, how 
they are paid, and when they are paid.’”450 The Circuit Court then ordered Medi-
Share to cease all operations in Kentucky unless it receives a certificate of authority 
or license from the Department of Insurance.451
However, Medi-Share’s story in Kentucky is not over.  First, the Christian Care 
Ministry filed a Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate the Franklin Circuit Court ruling 
regarding the Medi-Share program,452 which the court heard on October 24, 2012.453  
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446 Id. at 10.   
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448 Id.  Stephen Sullivan, General Counsel for Christian Care Ministries, Inc., also 
explained:   
Medi-Share's sharing process has substantially changed since the record in the 
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The Christian Care Ministry argued that the court’s decision was not ripe, the court 
misapplied the Kentucky Supreme Court’s standard from Commonwealth v. 
Reinhold, and the court failed to acknowledge well-settled principles of agency law 
that the actions of an attorney in fact under a power of attorney are the actions of the 
principal.454  
Second, on September 19, 2012, Kentucky Senator Tom Buford sponsored and 
pre-filed an amendment to K.R.S. § 304.1-120.455  Among other things, the proposed 
amendment seeks to delete the requirement of direct payment from one member to 
another and delete the requirement that the HCSM state that member gift amounts 
are voluntary with no assumption of risk or promise to pay.456 If amended, Medi-
Share presumably would comply with K.R.S. § 304.1-120, “as explicated by the 
Supreme Court in Reinhold.”457 The deletion of the direct sharing requirement and 
the requirement to “suggest[] amounts to give that are voluntary”458 would permit 
Medi-Share to act as an “intermediary” and “determine[] which needs are paid, how 
they are paid, and when they are paid.”459 Senator Buford’s proposed amendment 
would thus remove the legal support for the second part of the Reinhold decision and 
also render moot the Franklin County Circuit Court’s recent Opinion and Order
applying that decision. 
IX.  Conclusion: Observations and Analysis 
In conclusion, Health Care Sharing Ministries are not some kind of scam or “part 
of the problem[s]” with America’s health care system.460 HCSMs are “part of the 
solution”461 for America’s health care needs and this for several reasons.  First, 
HCSM membership exempts members from the individual mandate in the PPACA; 
second, HCSMs are affordable for most qualifying individuals and families; and 
lastly, HCSMs demonstrate the faith, values, caring, and ideals “all too often lacking 
in many health insurance options available today.”462   
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First, as noted above, the PPACA grants a religious exemption for HCSM 
members from the mandate to purchase insurance.463 HCSM members are exempt 
from the individual mandate precisely because HCSM members are paying their bills 
and sharing other members’ medical expenses.464 HCSMs are an established feature 
in the American health care landscape with a healthy thirty-year track record.  
HCSMs and their “members are here, they’re paying their bills.”465 This religious 
exemption from PPACA’s individual mandate, coupled with HCSMs’ low rates 
when compared to health insurance, has contributed to increased interest in HCSM 
membership with Samaritan Ministries.466 Tony Meggs, Medi-Share’s President and 
CEO, reported “Medi-Share’s steady growth ‘accelerated’ after the [PP]ACA was 
enacted,” and he expected “that growth to continue because . . . there is about a 40 
percent cost difference between an individual health insurance plan and a monthly 
Medi-Share contribution.”467   
Second, HCSMs offer a cost-effective method to pay for the rising costs of health 
care, when compared to health insurance policies.468  In 2010, the Citizens’ Council 
on Health Care prepared a chart comparing HCSM memberships to health insurance 
policies, figured for a family of four.469  First, the costs for a health insurance plan 
with a $5,000 deductible ranged between $300 and $400 per month, depending upon 
location, while the costs for a HCSM membership ranged from $240 to $400.470  
Second, HCSM members typically pay for the first $250 to $500 of any qualifying 
medical expenses per month; the rest is “published” or shared through the 
ministry.471  In addition, HCSM members needs potentially may be fully “published” 
or shared.472  In contrast, a $5,000 deductible health insurance policy requires the 
                                                          
463 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2012).  
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insured to pay up to 30% of the total bill for large expenses.473 Third, HCSM 
applicants are generally “never refused membership based upon previous medical 
conditions,” while insurance applicants “may be refused coverage due to prior 
conditions such as cancer, tobacco use, etc.”474 Fourth, HCSM members “may use 
any doctor or hospital without restriction,” while some insurance “plans specify 
which doctors may be used.  Access to specialist care may be restricted.”475   
In addition, the Christian Healthcare Ministry (CHM) provided a cost 
comparison between its “Gold Level” participation and average 2010 prices for 
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) plans, Preferred Provider Organization 
(PPO) plans, and Point of Service (POS) plans.476 The HMO, PPO, and POS family 
plans all cost over $1,100 per month, while CHM’s “Gold Level” plan costs $450.  
The HMO, PPO, and POS individual plans cost between $427 and $437, while 
CHM’s “Gold Level” individual plan costs $150.477 Thus, just from the savings 
alone, both through lower monthly “shares” as contrasted to premiums and much 
lower “deductibles,” HCSMs represent a financially sustainable means for ensuring 
the payment of the high costs of health care in the United States.   
Third, HCSMs are not merely an affordable substitute for insurance; HCSMs 
present a completely different option – and thus, the states should not seek to 
regulate HCSMs as if they were insurance. HCSMs “demonstrate the patient-
centered values, religious principles, free market ideals, charity, community focus, 
and compassion for fellow human beings that is all too often lacking in many health 
insurance options available today.”478  According to Mr. James Lansberry, Samaritan 
Ministries’ Vice President, HCSMs are a unique and viable alternative to health 
insurance companies because of the “community approach to healthcare . . . .”479   
Lansberry continued, “[t]hat makes this better than anything else out there . . . . We 
are trying to re-personalize healthcare, or put the care back into healthcare.”480  
Indeed, the community focus of HCSMs hearkens back to centuries-old Amish 
practices,481 who believe “it is their religious duty to help those in need, particularly 
                                                          
473 Brase, supra note 1, at 2.   
474 Brase, supra note 1, at 2.   
475 Brase, supra note 1, at 2.   
476 The Christian Healthcare Ministry, Counting the Cost, CHRISTIAN HEALTHCARE 
MINISTRY, http://www.chministries.org/countingthecost.aspx (last visited  July 23, 2012).   
477 Id.   
478 Brase, supra note 1, at 7.   
479 Brase, supra note 1, at 2 (quoting personal e-mail, Jan. 5, 2009). 
480 Brase, supra note 1, at 2.   
481 See Alliance of Health Care Sharing Ministries: History, ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE 
SHARING MINISTRIES, http://www.healthcaresharing.org/hcsm (last visited July 20, 2012) 
(comparing HCSMs to the Old Order Amish “Church Funds.” “HCSMs have grown in 
popularity and success ever since the Old Order Amish Church Fund began the modern-era of 
burden-bearing during the 1960’s. Today, participants from a broad spectrum of Christian 
denominations support each other’s medical needs across all fifty states and around the 
world.”).   
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those from their own community.”482 The Amish call this “Mutual Aid,” and the 
Amish fulfill this duty in several ways, one being by sharing the high costs of 
hospital bills, somewhat like a localized HCSM.483 Interestingly, Amish Mutual Aid 
went unchallenged for generations until the advent of Social Security.484 The Amish 
refused to pay the federal taxes for Social Security, believing Social Security was an 
insurance policy that violated their religious beliefs.485 The Amish eventually won an 
exemption from Social Security.486 The Amish and other similar religious groups 
also have a “religious conscience exemption” from PPACA’s “individual 
mandate.”487 Much like the Amish resistance to Social Security, HCSMs continue to 
work, state by state, for these “safe harbor” provisions from insurance regulations.488  
HCSMs have also secured a religious exemption from PPACA’s individual mandate, 
and rightly so, for in a powerful and compelling way, these religious health care 
sharing ministries return many back to the concept of “bearing one another’s 
burdens,” where “mutual aid” was the “foundation of social welfare in the United 
States.”489     
In conclusion, state legislatures should enact “safe harbor” provisions for 
HCSMs – and defer to federal regulation of HCSMs under PPACA, because some 
state insurance departments likely will continue to challenge HCSMs.490 Yet, why do 
state insurance departments seek to conform HCSMs to the image of insurance?  
Why, as one judge noted with a touch of irony, do “the consumers apparently 
needing the Department’s protection seek an exemption from those regulations”?491  
Perhaps one reason some state insurance officials view HCSMs with suspicion lies 
with the fact “our mentality has moved far from that of our ancestors.”492  Indeed, 
                                                          
482 Jennifer Girod, A Sustainable Medicine: Lessons from the Old Order Amish, 23 J. MED.
HUMAN. 31, 33 (2002).  
483 Id.  The author’s father, a family physician, once practiced medicine in and around 
Pennsylvania’s Amish country, and recalls hearing stories of the Amish paying large medical 
bills with briefcases of cash.   
484 Id.  
485 Id.   
486 Id.   
487 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)(2)(A) (West 2012).   
488 Alliance of Health Care Sharing Ministries, Current State Issues, ALLIANCE OF HEALTH 
CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, http://www.healthcaresharing.org/issues/index.php?State=None 
(last visited July 20, 2012).   
489 See supra text accompanying note 481.  
490 Diana B. Henriques, Ministry’s Medical Program Is Not Regulated, THE N.Y. TIMES, 
October 20, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/20/business/20religion 
.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all (Henriques quotes E. John Reinhold, chairman of Medi-Share, 
who stated: “We went through this eight years ago,” he said. “Then, you have a regime change 
and another set of bushy-tails comes into command and it starts up all over again,” regarding 
Kentucky’s challenge to Medi-Share.).  
491 In re Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc. No. 1-1004-14523-2, State of Minn. Office of 
Admin. Hearings for the Comm’r of Commerce, June 18, 2003. 
492 See supra text accompanying note 481.   
2013] HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES 279 
the Alliance of Health Care Sharing Ministries notes, “we hardly know what . . . the 
mandate to bear one another’s burdens . . . . means anymore.”493  Thus, for many of 
us, “[i]f an emergency medical problem arises, the government or the insurance 
company takes care of it, and our friends, relatives and neighbors have little 
participation in restoring us to our former state.”494 In the words of Indiana Insurance 
Commissioner James Atterholt, “all regulators [should] respect citizens’ rights to 
freely pursue their own solutions for their medical expenses, and recognize HCSMs 
for what they are: charitable organizations serving individuals who voluntarily 
support one another in their time of need.”495 In sum, HCSMs should be protected 
and not put off as insurance scams.  HCSMs should be helped, not hindered, as the 
many thousands of HCSM members seek to “[b]ear one another’s burdens, and thus 
fulfill the law of Christ.”496   
APPENDIX A: STATE AND FEDERAL CASE LAW LISTING THE ASSUMPTION OF THE 
RISK AS AN ELEMENT OF INSURANCE
1. Alabama: “Insurance exists when a contractual relationship between the 
insurer and the insured shifts the risk of loss from the insured to the insurer.”  
Warehouse Home Furnishing Distribs., Inc. v. Whitson, 709 So. 2d 1144, 
1152 (Ala. 1997) (citation omitted). 
2. Arizona: “Five elements are normally present in an insurance contract, 
which include: 1. An insurable interest; 2. A risk of loss; 3. An assumption 
of the risk by the insurer; 4. A general scheme to distribute the loss among 
the larger group of persons bearing similar risks; 5. The payment of a 
premium for the assumption of risk.” Guaranteed Warranty Corp., Inc. v. 
State ex rel. Humphrey, 533 P.2d 87, 90 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (citations 
omitted).   
3. California: “Essential to insurance is the element of shifting of the risk of 
loss, subject to contingent or future events, by legally binding agreement.”  
Richardson v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 207 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984) (citation omitted).   
“Insurance Code section 22 (section 22) defines insurance as “a 
contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, 
damage, or liability arising from a contingent or unknown event.” 
Section 22 has been interpreted as requiring two elements: (1) shifting 
one party's risk of loss to another party; and (2) distribution of that risk 
among similarly situated persons.”  Auto. Funding Grp, Inc. v. 
Garamendi, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 912, 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citation 
omitted).   
4. Delaware: “Insurance, in its basic operation, involves the setting aside of 
money to establish a fund sufficient to respond to claims arising from 
predictable risks. Whether the funding be through contract with an 
independent insurer, or self-funding, or a combination of the two through 
partial self-insurance in the form of deductibles, the result is the same. A 
                                                          
493 Id.   
494 Id.   
495 Letter from James Atterholt to James Lansberry (May 7, 2009) (on file with author).   
496 Galatians 6:2.   
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fund is created to protect against risk of bodily harm or property damage.”  
Stop & Shop Cos., Inc. v. Gonzales, 619 A.2d 896, 898 (Del. 1993) (citation 
omitted). 
5. District of Columbia: “The primary elements of an insurance contract are the 
spreading and underwriting of a policyholder's risk.  It is characteristic of 
insurance that a number of risks are accepted, some of which involve losses, 
and that such losses are spread over all the risks so as to enable the insurer to 
accept each risk at a slight fraction of the possible liability upon it.” Carter v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 808 A.2d 466, 472 (D.C. 2002) (citations 
omitted).   
 “Whether the contract is one of insurance or of indemnity there must be a 
risk of loss to which one party may be subjected by contingent or future 
events and an assumption of it by legally binding arrangement by another. 
Even the most loosely stated conceptions of insurance and indemnity require 
these element. Hazard is essential and equally so a shifting of its incidence. 
If there is no risk, or there being one it is not shifted to another or others, 
there can be neither insurance nor indemnity. Insurance also, by the better 
view, involves distribution of the risk,  but distribution without assumption 
hardly can be held to be insurance. These are elemental conceptions and 
controlling ones.”  Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 245 (D.C. 
Cir. 1939) (finding a group health association not insurance).   
6. Florida: “Whether the contract is one of insurance or of indemnity there 
must be a risk of loss to which one party may be subjected by contingent or 
future events and an assumption of it by legally binding arrangement by 
another. Even the most loosely stated conceptions of insurance and 
indemnity require these element[s]. Hazard is essential.... If there is no risk, 
... there can be [no] insurance.” Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Abernathy, 93 
So. 3d 352, 359 (Fla. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted). 
7. Georgia: “Broadly defined, insurance is a contract by which one party, for a 
compensation called the premium, assumes particular risks of the other party 
and promises to pay to him or his nominee a certain or ascertainable sum of 
money on a specified contingency.”  Bankers' Health & Life Ins. Co. v. 
Knott, 154 S.E. 194, 196 (Ga. Ct. App. 1930) (citation omitted).   
8. Idaho: ““Insurance” is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify 
another or pay or allow a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit upon 
determinable risk contingencies.”  “…coverage for real and determinable 
risks … therefore comes within the statutory definition of insurance.”  
Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 18 P.3d 956, 961 (Idaho 2000). 
9. Illinois: “Thus, it appears that “insurance” can be characterized as involving: 
(1) a contract or agreement between an insurer and an insured which exists 
for a specific period of time; (2) an insurable interest (usually property) 
possessed by the insured; (3) consideration in the form of a premium paid by 
the insured to the insurer; and (4) the assumption of risk by the insurer 
whereby the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured for potential pecuniary 
loss to the insured's property resulting from certain specified perils.”  Griffin 
Sys., Inc. v. Washburn, 505 N.E.2d 1121, 1123-24 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987). 
10. Indiana: “Generally, insurance is a contract of indemnity through which a 
party undertakes an obligation to compensate another against loss arising 
from certain specified contingencies or perils by shifting the risk of loss 
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from the insured to the insurer.”  Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 654 
N.E.2d 861, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted).  
11. Iowa: “[T]o be considered insurance, the assumption of risk by the promoter 
must be the ‘principal object and purpose of the program.’”   Barberton 
Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Ins. Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586 
N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 1998) (citation omitted).   
“A contract is one of insurance if it meets the following test: one 
party, for compensation, assumes the risk of another; the party who 
assumes the risk agrees to pay a certain sum of money on a specified 
contingency; and the payment is made to the other party or the party's 
nominee.”  Iowa Contractors Workers' Comp. Grp. v. Iowa Ins. Guar. 
Ass'n, 437 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Iowa 1989) (citation omitted). 
12. Kansas: “Whether a company is engaged in the insurance business depends 
* * * on the character of the business that it transacts * * * and whether the 
assumption of a risk, or some other matter to which it is related, is the 
principal object and purpose of the business.” State ex rel. Londerholm v. 
Anderson, 408 P.2d 864, 875 (Kan. 1966) (citation omitted). 
13. Kentucky: “An insurance policy is a contract of indemnity whereby the 
insurer agrees to indemnify the insured for any loss resulting from a specific 
event. The insurer undertakes the obligation based on an evaluation of the 
market's wide risks and losses. An insurer expects losses, and they are 
actuarially predicted. The cost of such losses are spread through the market 
by means of a premium.” Buck Run Baptist Church, Inc. v. Cumberland Sur. 
Ins. Co., 983 S.W.2d 501, 504-505 (Ky. 1998). 
14. Louisiana: “The primary characteristic of the business of insurance is the 
transferring or spreading of risk.  So long as this characteristic is present, the 
business of insurance is not limited to traditionally recognized areas of 
insurance.”  Louisiana Safety Ass'n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. 
Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 17 So.3d 350, 358, n.27 (La. 2009) (internal 
citation omitted). 
15. Maryland: “Thus an insurance contract is one whereby for a stipulated 
consideration one party undertakes to compensate the other for loss on a 
specified subject by specified perils.”  Chicago Bonding & Ins. Co. v. 
Oliner, 115 A. 592, 593 (Md. 1921) (citation omitted). 
16. Michigan: “Insurance is a contract in which one party, for consideration, 
assumes delineated risks of the other party.” King v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 
668 N.W.2d 357, 369 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citation omitted). 
17. Minnesota: “An insurance policy essentially shifts the risk of loss from the 
insured to the insurer whereby the insurer assumes the risk of loss and 
undertakes to indemnify the insured against such loss.”  Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Dynamic Air, Inc., 702 N.W.2d 237, 244 (Minn. 2005) 
(citation omitted). 
18. Mississippi: “Mississippi recognizes that an insured bargains for more than 
mere eventual monetary proceeds of a policy; insureds bargain for such 
intangibles as risk aversion, peace of mind, and certain and prompt payment 
of the policy proceeds upon submission of a valid claim.” Andrew Jackson 
Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172, 1179, n.9 (Miss. 1990). 
19. Nebraska:  “Insurance is a contract by which one party assumes specified 
risks of the other party for a consideration, and promises to pay him or his 
beneficiary an ascertainable sum of money on the happening of a specified 
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contingency.” Adolf v. Union Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 101 N.W.2d 504, 508-509 
(Neb. 1960).  
20. New Hampshire: “The common definition of ‘insurance’ includes both ‘the 
action or process of insuring ... against loss or damage by a contingent event 
(as death, fire, accident, or sickness’ and ‘a device for the elimination or 
reduction of an economic risk common to all members of a large group and 
employing a system of equitable contributions out of which losses are 
paid,’” New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass'n Emp. Benefit Trust v. New 
Hampshire Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 914 A.2d 812, 815 (N.H. 2006) (internal 
citation omitted). 
21. New Jersey:  “The essence of an insurance contract is the shifting of the risk 
of loss from the insured to the insurer. The essence of self-insurance, a term 
of colloquial currency rather than of precise legal meaning, is the retention 
of the risk of loss by the one upon whom it is directly imposed by law or 
contract.” American  Nurses Ass'n v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 471 A.2d 66, 69 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (internal citation omitted).  
22. New Mexico: “Insurance is a contract whereby for consideration one party 
agrees to indemnify or guarantee another party against specified risks. . . . In 
contrast, self-insurance is a process of risk retention whereby an entity 
‘set[s] aside assets to meet foreseeable future losses.’. . . A self-insurer 
protects itself from liability; it does not assume the risk of another.” Cordova 
v. Wolfel, 903 P.2d 1390, 1392 (N.M. 1995) (internal citations omitted). 
23. New York:  “The contract of insurance is an agreement whereby, for a 
stipulated consideration or premium, the insurance company undertakes to 
indemnify the other against certain risks in which that party has an interest 
recognized by law.” Home Ins. Co. v. Bernstein, 16 N.Y.S.2d 45, 47 (N.Y. 
Mun. Ct. 1939).     
24. North Carolina: “One characteristic of an insurance contract is the shifting of 
a risk from the insured to the insurer. If no risk is shifted there is not an 
insurance contract.”  Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 420 S.E.2d 
432, 435 (N.C. 1992) (internal citation omitted). 
25. Ninth Circuit: “The ‘underwriting or spreading of risk’ was held to be an 
‘indispensable characteristic of insurance.’” Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass'n v. 
Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation 
omitted).  
26. Ohio: “‘Broadly defined, insurance is a contract by which one party, for a 
compensation called the premium, assumes particular risks of the other party 
and promises to pay to him or his nominee a certain or ascertainable sum of 
money on a specified contingency.’” State ex rel. Duffy v. Western Auto 
Supply Co., 16 N.E.2d 256, 259 (Ohio 1938) (internal citation omitted).   
27. South Dakota: “‘The essence of an insurance contract is the shifting of the 
risk of loss from the insured to the insurer.’” ‘Shifting the risk’ can be 
defined as ‘the transfer of the impact of a potential loss from the insured to 
the insurer.’”  State Div. of Ins. v. Norwest Corp., 581 N.W.2d 158, 161 
(S.D. 1998) (internal citations omitted). 
28. Texas: “Broadly defined, insurance is a contract by which one party for a 
consideration assumes particular risks of the other party and promises to pay 
him or someone named by him a certain or ascertainable sum of money on a 
specified contingency.”  Denton v. Ware, 228 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. App. 
1949) (internal citation omitted).   
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29. Utah: “The Utah Insurance Code defines insurance as “an arrangement, 
contract, or plan for the transfer of a risk or risks from one or more persons 
to one or more other persons.”  Pugh v. North Am. Warr. Servs., Inc., 1 P.3d 
570, 574 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (internal citation omitted). 
30. Virginia: “With self-insurance, there is neither an insured nor an insurer. In 
fact, self-insurance does not involve the transfer of a risk of loss, but rather a 
retention of that risk, making it the ‘antithesis of insurance.’” Farmers Ins. 
Exch. v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 708 S.E.2d 852, 857 (Va. 2011) (internal 
citation omitted). 
31. Washington: “Life insurance involves both risk-shifting and risk-
distributing. A contract may be a risk-shifting device, but to be a contract of 
insurance, which is a risk-distributing device, it must possess both features, 
and unless it does it is not a contract of insurance whatever be its name or its 
form.”  In re Smiley's Estate, 216 P.2d 212, 214 (Wash. 1950) (citation 
omitted). 
APPENDIX B: STATES WITH “SAFE HARBOR” STATUTES FOR HCSMS  
1. Alabama –  ALA. CODE § 22-6A-3 (2012) (effective 2012). 
2. Arizona – ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-122 (2012) (effective 2011).  
3. Florida – FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.1265 (West 2012) (effective 2008).   
4. Georgia – GA. CODE ANN. § 33-1-20 (West 2012) (effective 2011).   
5. Iowa – IOWA CODE ANN. § 505-22 (West 2012) (effective 1995).  
6. Illinois – 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4(b) (West 2012) (effective 2013).   
7. Indiana – IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-2.1-1, 1-2 (West 2012) (effective 2012).  
8. Kansas – KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-202(j) (West 2012).   
9. Kentucky – KY. REV. STAT. § 304.1-120 (7) (West 2012).   
10. Maryland – MD. CODE. ANN., INS. §1-202 (4) (West 2012). 
11. Maine – ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 704 (3) (West 2012). 
12. Missouri – MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1750 (West 2012) (effective 2007).   
13. New Hampshire – N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126-V:1 (2013) (effective 2012). 
14. North Carolina – N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-49-12 (West 2012) (effective 
2011).  
15. Oklahoma – OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 110-11 (West 2012). 
16. Pennsylvania – 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 23 (West 2012) (effective 1994). 
17. South Dakota – S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-1-3.3 (2012) (effective 2012). 
18. Utah – UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-1-103(3)(c) (West 2012). 
19. Virginia – VA. CODE. ANN. § 38.2-6300, 6301 (West 2012) (effective 2008).  
20. Washington – WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.009 (West 2012).  
21. Wisconsin – WIS. STAT. ANN. § 600.01 (1)(b)(9) (West 2012). 
 
